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POVERTY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ARVAL A. MORR.IS*
From the beginnings of recorded time, when tribes and kindreds of
men began to strive for what they considered to be the good life, we
can find evidence tracing man's quest for equality, particularly equal-
ity before the law.' The demand for equal legal treatment has always
been a deeply felt necessity of the Anglo-Saxon world.2 The noble
ideal of equal justice for rich or poor is fundamental; it underlies
American legal institutions,' and permeates our folklore. For example,
the symbol of Then-is, the goddess who balances the scales of justice
without regard to person, typifies the American ideal of equal justice
for any accused. This ideal, however, must confront, and not blanch,
at the reality implicit in the satirical words of Anatole France: "The
law, in its majestic equality, forbids all men to sleep under bridges, to
beg in the streets, and to steal bread-the rich as well as the poor."
A conflict of the ideal of equality with reality exists today. Al-
though our society has been characterized as affluent, there exist many
citizens for whom reasonable legal fees appear unreasonable or impos-
* Professor of Law, University of Washington
'The doctrine of legal equality germinated at least as early as the teachings of
Aristotle and Confucious. See, e.g.: ". . . [P]olitical justice ... is found among
men who share their life with a view to self-sufficiency, men who are free and either
proportionately or arithmetically equal, so that between those who do not fulfill this
condition there is no justice.. . ." Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics V, 6; McKEAN,
BAsIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, 1013 (1941) and "The magistrate ... is the guardian
of justice, and, if of justice, then of equality also... ." Id. at 1201. And see the
Works of Mencius, VI, I, 7 quoted in MclvER, GREAT EXPRESSIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 25 (1950).
2 The Magna Carta declares that "To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse
or delay, right or justice." Magna Carta, cap. 40 (1215), and see Thompson, Magna
Carta 365, 380 (1948), and McKechnie, Magna Carta 127, 395-98 (1914). By Brac-
ton's time it was accepted that the poor should have their writs handled for nothing.
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 195 (2nd ed. 1909), and see SMITH,
JUSTICE AND THE POOR 3 (1919).
3 E.g., see The Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to" be self-
evident, that all men are created equal ... " or consider: ". . . nor shall any
state . . .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. However, one recent book observes that this ideal is fre-
quently observed in the breach; see, GER HENSoN, THE BENCH IS WARPED: EQUAL
JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW? (1963).
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sible. For example, in addition to welfare recipients,4 almost one-fifth
of the families, having nearly one-fourth of the children, have "in-
comes below the taxable limit under present federal income tax laws-
that is, less than $1,325 for a mother and child and less than $2,675
for a married couple with two children and $4,000 for a family of six.5
On the other hand, the urban family "in the $10,000-plus income class
consumes eight times the dollar value of all goods consumed by the
under $1,000-income class, four times as much as the $2,000-$3,000
class, and twice as much as the $5,000-$6,000 class."6 Thus, those who
live below the poverty line7 provide the proving ground with which to
test the genuine realization of the American ideal of equal justice for
every accused.
It has long been known that poverty plays an important role in the
direct administration of the criminal law. It plays a role at the arrest
stage,8 but its influence can better be seen at the bail stage. If an
4 For December 1960, the Social Security Administration reported the following
totals (rounded): old age assistance (OAA)-2,332,000 persons; aid to the blind(AB)-107,600 persons; aid to dependent children (ADC)-806,300 families(2,378,200 children); aid to permanently and totally disabled (APTD)-374,000
persons; general assistance (GA)-431,000 families. See Current Operating Statistics,
24 Social Security Bull. No. 4, Tables 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, pp. 38-40 (April 1961).
5 Epstein, Some Effects of Low Income on Children and Their Families, 24 Social
Security Bull. No. 2, p. 12 (Feb. 1961). In 1947, 60% of all defendants-97,000 in
serious criminal cases-were financially unable to employ counsel. BROWNELL, LEGAL
AID IN THE UNITED STATES, 83-4 (1951) and 12-3 (Supp. 1961).
6 Kolko, Wealth and Power In America 125 (1962). Accepting the Internal
Revenue Service figures, the New York Times reports that "398 taxpayers had in-
comes of at least $1,000,000 for 1961 ...This was 92 more than in 1960 . . ." New
York Times, Sept. 15, 1963, Mag. Section, p. 37 Col. 1.
7 In 1904, Robert Hunter concluded that 10,000,000 Americans lived in poverty,
and, in 1906, J. A. Ryan found that at least 60 percent of American male wage
earners received less than $600 per year. For discussion see BREMNER, FROM THE
DEPTHS: THE DISCOVERY OF POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 151-54 (1956). In 1954,
about eight million families had incomes of $2,000 or less, and one family out of every
eleven had an income of $1,000 or less. About 2/3 of the low income families are
non-farm families with their prime source of money being wage earnings. About
4,800,000 people live alone and have incomes less than $1,000 per year. These data
are taken from a Message of the Governor of the State of New York and are
reported in Willcox and Blaustein, The Griffin Case, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 4, note 17(1957), and see also, HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES (1962) who estimates that, "The poor in America constitute about 25 percent
of the total population. They number somewhere between 40,000,000 and 50,000,000,
depending upon the criterion of low income that is adopted." Id. at 190. On the
poverty standard see Snyder, A Method of Identifying Chronic Low Income Groups
From Cross-Section Survey Data, 23 STUDIES IN INCOME AND WEALTH 333 (1950).
8 McKay, Poverty and the Administration of Criminal Justice, 35 U. COLO. L. REV.
323 (1963). Indeed, it seems to play a significant role in the crime of vagrancy. See
Lacy, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HAuv. L. REV. 1203(1953). Poverty also plays a role in selecting those persons who will suffer capital
punishment. Consider the words of Lewis E. Laws, long a warden of Sing Sing
prison: "In the twelve years of my wardenship I have escorted 150 men and one
woman to the death chamber and electric chair. In ages they ranged from 17 to 63.
They came from all kinds of homes and environments. In one respect they were all
alike. All were poor ..... LAws, TWENTY THOUSAND YEARS IN SING SING 302
(1932).
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arrested person can produce money sufficient for bail, then he is free to
continue earning funds to hire an attorney, to locate witnesses or to
finance an investigation of his case. But those indigent accused, who
do not possess funds sufficient to make bail,' not only cannot under-
take these steps, but additionally:
They must consult court-appointed counsel not in the privacy and
convenience of an office but in jail. The defendant enters court in the
company of a guard, a fact not lost to jurors. If convicted, he is unable
to point to employment and good conduct while on bail as grounds for
probation; if found not guilty he has needlessly suffered the degreda-
tion of jail and his family has been punished as well. There is good
ground for suspecting that the outcome of his case, as to both judg-
ment and sentence, is materially influenced by whether he is in jail or
on bail.10
This situation calls for solution; it touches the very wellsprings of
balance within our adversary system and questions an even-handed
administration of American criminal justice.
On March 18, 1963, the United States Supreme Court dealt with
several aspects of the role that poverty plays in the criminal law
processes. On that day, the Court handed down six cases; they dealt
with an indigent's right to counsel at trial and on appeal, an indigent's
right to a transcript on direct and collateral appeal, and with the role
of the United States district courts in habeas corpus proceedings.
These are historic cases, and no individual can fathom all their rami-
fications. Yet, there can be no doubt that through these cases the
United States Supreme Court has contributed mightily to our col-
lective attempts to realize our national aspirations of democratic gov-
ernment under law, and to our ideal of equal justice for every accused.
The common thread knitting these decisions into a coherent and con-
sistent constitutional policy is a deep and uniform respect for human
dignity which is the nourishment necessary to the true meaning of
freedom. 1 This latter consideration, and the extent of its social reali-
9 A comprehensive study of the New York City municipal courts showed that in
1958, 51 percent of all defendants did not post bond. Note, A Study of the Adminis-
tration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 693, 707 (1958). A field study
of the metropolitan courts of Philadelphia showed that where bail is set by the court,
75 percent of all defendants charged with serious crimes were held in jail from time
of arrest until trial. Note, Compelling Appearance in Court, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 1031,
1048 (1954), and see Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Re-examined, 70 YALE LJ.
966, 970 (1961).
10 Ares & Sturz, Bail and the Indigent Accused, 8 CIE AND DELINQUENCY 12,
15 (1962), and see also, 7he Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Ad-
ministration of Criminal Justice, Report, Bail and Pre-Trial Release, 58-90 (1963).11 See Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication, 66 YALEa
L.J. 319 (1957).
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zation, fundamentally sets us apart from all totalitarian countries.
The purpose of this article 2 is to review these six cases, to place them
in a context and to comment on some of their many implications.
TRANSCRIPTS AND INDIGENT CRIMINAL APPEALS
The history of Anglo-American legal practices reveals that the right,
of either defendant or prosecutor, to appeal a criminal case is a right
of comparatively recent origin. This innovation is, today, so much a
necessary and appropriate part of the administration of criminal
justice that it has become commonplace, and its recent beginnings are
occasionally forgotten. For it was only in 1879 that Congress first
authorized the circuit courts of appeal to issue writs of error in crimi-
nal cases, and then solely on a discretionary basis. 3 In 1907, Great
Britain enacted the Criminal Appeal Act, 4 and placed the English
criminal appeal on its current foundations. The historical situation
has varied among the several states. In Washington, the right to
appeal a criminal case has been secured by the state constitution since
1889." This right can, of course, be waived.' And, although the right
is constitutionally guaranteed, the Washington legislature can pre-
scribe reasonable, but mandatory, procedures for its exercise, so long
as they do not infringe upon constitutional rights of the litigants.'
Although the criminal appeal is a modern innovation, nevertheless,
it is an integral and indispensible part of the total criminal law process.
As a judicial technique it serves as the medium through which an
even-handed administration of criminal justice can be assured, and,
perhaps, made more humane. In addition, the criminal appeal serves
as an important, albeit fallible," protection against mistakes and
12 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Fifth Annual Pacific North-
west Seminar of Appellate and Trial Court Judges, held at the University of Wash-
ington, Seattle, Washington, July 10, 1963.
1320 Stat. 354, c.176 (1879). Also note 26 Stat. 826, c.517 (1891) and The Attorney
General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice,
Report, Ch. IV, "Access To Appellate Review," 90-115 (1963).
14 7 Edw. VII, c.2 3 (1907).
15 "In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have . . . the right to appeal in all
cases...." WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 22 and WASH. CoNsT. amendment X.
16 See State v. Eckert, 123 Wash. 403, 212 Pac. 551 (1923).
17 See In re Mason, 42 Wn.2d 610, 257 P.2d 211 (1953); State v. Gundlach, 36
Wn.2d 918, 221 P.2d 502 (1950), and State v. White, 40 Wash. 428, 82 Pac. 743 (1905).
18 Note the perceptive words of Judge Hale: "Through the centuries, it has been
the goal of the courts, law teachers and lawyers to create and maintain forums where
only the truth will emerge. That this goal from time to time has not been reached
goes without saying. Being institutions created by and conducted by people, the courts
are subject to the same imperfections which people are heir to. . . . Because witnesses,
jurors, lawyers and even judges bring with them into the courtroom all of the physical,
emotional and intellectual qualities-differing one from the other in a thousand ways-
which go to make up the total human personality, it is likely that reactions to the
[VoL. 3
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abuses in lower court proceedings which can lead to improper convic-
tions of persons who have been charged with committing crimes. The
overall significance of the criminal appeal can easily be seen from
statistics. For example, in the federal system almost twenty percent
of the criminal cases appealed from 1958 to 1962, to the court of
appeals resulted in reversals of the lower federal court. 9 The percent-
ages of reversals are greater in some of the states, including Washing-
ton.2" Given these facts, it is obvious that ready access to appellate
review by convicted defendants, whatever their financial status, is an
essential ingredient in the proper administration of criminal justice.
Unquestionably, appellate review of criminal convictions is impor-
tant and fundamental. However, there is no decision of the United
States Supreme Court holding that a convicted defendant has a con-
stitutional right to appeal a criminal case. To the contrary, that Court,
in an early case,2' held that "a review by an appellate court of the
final judgment in a criminal case, however grave the offense of which
the accused is convicted, was not at common law and is not now a
necessary element of due process of law." 2 This is a flat statement,
but it should not be read as implying that the United States Constitu-
same situations will vary in different individuals." State v. Swenson, 382 P.2d 614,
627 (Wash. 1963). For corroboration of judge Hale's view, see FRANK, & FRANx,
Nor GUILTY (1957); BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); Pollak, The
Errors of Justice, 284 ANNALS 115 (1952), and Hirschberg, Wrongful Convictions,
13 RocKY MT. L. REV. 20 (1940).
19 Annual Report of The Director of The Administrative Office of The United
States Courts (1958-62). The percentages were: 1958-20.8%; 1959-19.6%; 1960-
17.7%; 1961-21.4%; 1962-20.9%.
20 From 1887 to 1922, something less than 15 percent of criminal appeals in New
York were successful. Rep. N. K Crime Comm. 45 (1927). In California, from 1900
to 1926, the percentage ranged from 12.6 percent to 22.5 percent. See Vernier and
Selig, The Reversal of Criminal Cases in the Supreme Court of California, 2 So. CAL.
L. Rrv. 21, 26 (1928). From 1907 to 1912 the following percentages of reversals were
obtained in courts of appeal in criminal cases: Wisconsin 30 percent, Michigan 31
percent, Massachusetts 23 percent, New Hampshire 22 percent, Kansas 20 percent,
South Dakota 30 percent, California 20 percent, Georgia 16 percent. 3 J. CRIm. LAw
& CRIMINoLoGY 569 (1913). In Ohio for the period July 1, 1930, to December 31,
1930, 22 percent of criminal cases appealed were reversed. HARRIS, APPELLATE COURTS
AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN OHIO 86 (1933). The Librarian of the Institute of
Judicial Administration, Inc., has supplied us with the following figures: In Con-
necticut, in 1954, 17 percent of criminal convictions appealed were reversed; in Kansas,
for the years 1952-1953, 12 percent of the criminal convictions were reversed; in
Kentucky, in 1954, 23 percent were reversed; in Washington, in 1952, 13 percent
were reversed, and in 1953, 25 percent were reversed; in Wisconsin, in 1952 and
1953, the percentage of reversals was 40; and in New York County for the years
1946 through 1948, the percentage of reversals was 17.4. See brief for petitioners in
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (No. 95, Oct. Term, 1955, Sup. Ct. of the U.S.
at p. 25, footnote 6, et seq.).
21 McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
22 Id. at 687. "Thus, it is now settled that due process of law does not require a
State to afford review of criminal judgments." Per Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 21 (1956) (concurring opinion).
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tion fails to apply to state criminal appeals. Neither the fact that a
state may deny the right of appeal entirely, nor the authority of a
state to make appropriate classifications, enables a state to impose
burdens on appellants in criminal cases which have no relation to a
rational state policy governing criminal appeals. This much was made
clear in 1915 when the Supreme Court held that "where... an appeal
is provided.., the proceedings in the appellate tribunal are to be
regarded as part of the process of law under which [a defendant] is
held in custody by the State.... "23 This latter view is the traditional
one and accounts for the Court's historic role of correcting certain
unconstitutional dispositions made by some state appellate courts.24
In recent years, significant constitutional controls over the criminal
appeal processes of both state and federal systems have evolved.
Nevertheless, a complete statement of the relevant constitutional
criteria remains to be expressed by the United State Supreme Court.
Yet, one of the more important cases, stating a dynamic constitutional
principle, is Griffin v. Illinois.5 It turned on an interpretation of the
fourteenth amendment, and hence, directly binds only the states. Even
so, the principle there announced is so basic to the fabric of criminal
law administration that Griffin has come to be equally relevant to the
criminal law processes in the federal courts.26 A consideration of that
case is in order.
Griffin and Crenshaw, two indigent petitioners, were convicted of
armed robbery in the criminal court of Cook County, Illinois. Im-
mediately thereafter, they moved the trial court to supply them,
without cost, a certified copy of the entire trial court proceedings
because they were "poor persons with no means of paying the neces-
sary fees to acquire the Transcript and Court Records needed to
prosecute an appeal. . . ,27 They contended that failure to provide
these materials would violate the due process and equal protection
23 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 327 (1915).
24 See, e.g., Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951) (prison rules
prohibited prisoners from pursuing their appeals because they denied prisoners the
right to file petitions in court), and Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948) (state
court affirmed a conviction under a statutory section different from the one charged
in the information and submitted to the jury).
25 351 U.S. 12 (1956) ; See Willcox and Blaustein, The Griffin Case, 43 CORNELL
L. Q. 1 (1957).
26 See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446-8 (1962).
27 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13 (1956). In oral argument, the Illinois Attorney
General candidly, and appropriately, admitted that "there isn't any way that an Illinois
convicted person in a non-capital case can obtain a bill of exceptions without paying
for it." Id. at 14, note 4. Indigent defendants who had been sentenced to death were
the only ones entitled to a free transcript. Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 38, § 769(a) (1955).
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clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Under Illinois practice, it was
a necessary condition for jurisdiction that a defendant, who sought
full appellate review by writ of error, must first furnish the appellate
court with a bill of exceptions or a report of proceedings at the trial
which had been certified by the trial judge. 8 Thus, the transcript 9
of the trial court's proceedings was essential to a bill of exceptions. 0
Otherwise, review would have been limited only to those errors ap-
pearing on the face of the "mandatory record," the latter consisted
of the indictment, arraignment, plea, verdict and sentence. Such
partial review would have precluded an appeal of all trial errors such
as mistakes in jury instructions or mistaken admissions of evidence,
etc." The trial court denied petitioners' motion for a transcript
without holding a hearing.
Griffin and Crenshaw then filed a petition under the Illinois post-
conviction act"2 which restricted court consideration exclusively to
constitutional questions. Arguing that they had been denied due
process and equal protection of the laws, the petitioners alleged that
their original trial contained reversible, but non-constitutional errors,
such as erroneous admissions of evidence, and that the only impedi-
ment to full appellate review and subsequent reversal was their lack
of money with which to buy a transcript. The allegations of reversible
non-constitutional errors were not denied.8" This petition was dis-
missed without a hearing, and the Illinois supreme court, without
formal opinion, affirmed on the sole ground that the petition presented
no substantial constitutional question."'
By a vote of five to four, the United States Supreme Court reversed.
2s See Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 110, § 259.70 A (1953) (Supreme Court Rule 70 A), and
Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 110, § 101.65 (1955) (Supreme Court Rule 65).
291 use the term "transcript" throughout this article to include both the statement
of facts elicited during the trial and the paper record of the filed pleadings. This usage
differs from Washington practice which is unique, and not in accord with the more
common usage found in other states. Washington practice refers to copies of the
various documents which have been filed with the clerk of the trial court as the
"transcript of the record," see Rule 44 of the Rules on Appeal, and to the court re-
porter's reproduction of the trial proceedings as the "statement of facts," see Rule 35
of the Rules on Appeal.
80 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956). "A complete bill of exceptions
consists of all proceedings in the case from the time of the convening of the court
until the termination. It includes all of the motions and rulings of the trial court,
evidence heard, instructions and other matters which do not come within the clerk's
mandatory record." People v. McKinley, 409 Ill. 120, 124-5, 98 N.E.2d 728, 730 (1951).
31 See People v. Loftus, 400 Ill. 432, 81 N.E2d 495 (1948) ; Cullen v. Stevens, 389
11I. 35, 58 N.E2d 456 (1945), and Speck, A Study of the Illinois Supreme Court, 15
U. CHL. L. REv. 107, 125 (1947).
32 Ill. Rev. Stat ch. 38 §§ 826-832 (1955).
83 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 15 (1956).
34 Id. at 15.
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Technically, there is no opinion of the Court. Mr. Justice Black an-
nounced the Court's judgment and filed an opinion, concurred in by
three other Justices, Messrs. Clark, Douglas and Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, while Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a special concurring
opinion." Nevertheless, it seemed clear then, and subsequent events
have unequivocally shown, that the Court had approved at least this
simple proposition: 6 If a state has provided a scheme for criminal
appeals, then the equal protection clause, and perhaps the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, prevent that state from denying
appellate review to indigent defendants solely on the ground of their
poverty, when they lack money to purchase a transcript of the trial
court's record and when the filing of such a transcript is made a
condition precedent to their obtaining full appellate review. Stated
another way:" If a state desires to follow an appellate procedure
that requires a payment of money which indigents cannot pay, then
it must provide an alternative procedure that affords as adequate
and effective review for indigent appeals. As Mr. Justice Black put
it: "There can be no equal justice where the kind of a trial a man
gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants
must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have
money enough to buy transcripts."" "Plainly, the ability to pay costs
in advance bears no rational relationship to a defendant's guilt or
innocence and could not be used as an excuse to deprive a defendant
of a fair trial."39
The disproportionate impact of appellate costs on the affluent and the
poor has long been viewed by the law reviews as one inequitable aspect
of the criminal appeal." However, Griffin is the first case to recognize
squarely that a state-imposed cost requirement could work a denial
of equal protection, and perhaps a deprivation of due process of law.
35 The dissenting justices-Burton, Minton, Reed and Harlan-denied that the
Constitution of the United States compels each state to supply a transcript, or other
means to afford reviews, to an indigent defendant in a non-capital case. They held
that a state was not bound to help redress indigency on the part of defendants: "Some
can afford better lawyers and better investigations of their cases. Some can afford
bail, some cannot. Why fix bail at any reasonable sum if a poor man can't make it?"
Id. at 28-29. In addition, the dissenters, joined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, expressed
their concern over the fact that Mr. Justice Black's opinion "is not limited to the
future . . ." Ibid. Mr. Justice Harlan, in a separate dissent, additionally took the
position that the constitutional question ought not to have been decided. Id. at 33.
36 See Allen, Griffin v. Illinois, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 151, 152 (1957).
37 See Qua, Griffin v. Illinois, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 143, 146 (1957).
38 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
39 Id. at 17-18.
40 E.g., Smyth, The Limitation of the Right of Appeal itn Criminal Cases, 17 HARv.
L. RE V. 317, 319-20, 330 (1904).
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The principle embedded in the Griffin case is broad and susceptible
to dynamic application. In one of its dimensions, it reinforces an
evolving state action concept which holds in certain circumstances,
that the fourteenth amendment places a duty on a state to take posi-
tive action to alleviate inequities, in this instance financial. This duty
exists even in situations where the inequities have not been the direct
consequence of state discriminatory policies, i.e., a person's financial
status. The implication is that a state's failure to discharge this duty
and to correct these inequities amounts to state enforcement of dis-
criminatory state policy, contrary to the fourteenth amendment."1
This view has obvious implications for race relations,42 and pushed
to a dryly logical extreme, in other situations, it could produce curious
results. Ripped from its racial or criminal law context, this aspect
of the Griffin principle could be argued in such a way as to view
tuition costs at a state university as a denial of equal protection (or,
with greater plausibility and within the criminal law context, the
payment of bail costs as a condition of release from custody) because
such costs create inequality of access between the affluent and the
poor to state provided opportunities." It appears, however, that the
more direct and immediate impact of the Griffin case has been on the
processes of the criminal law.
Griffin involved a situation, similar to that prevailing in Wash-
ington, where a defendant's right to appeal is founded in state law
and is not discretionary. Even so, it was predicted then that there
could be little doubt that the dynamic Griffin principle encompassed
41 See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) ; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944). See also the discussion by Lewis, The Sit-Ins: Great Expectations, to be
pub, in III Supreme Court Review (Kurland ed. (1963)), and Horowitz, The Mis-
leading Search for State Action Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 So. CAL. L.
REV. 208 (1957).
42 Sitting en bane the California Supreme Court expounded this point with respect
to de-facto segregation: ". . . in the absence of gerrymandering or other discrimina-
tory conduct, by a school board, a student under some circumstances would be entitled
to relief where, by reason of residential segregation, substantial racial imbalance
exists in his school.... Where such segregation exists it is not enough for a school
board to refrain from affirmative discriminatory conduct. . . . The right to an equal
opportunity for education and the harmful consequences of segregation require that
school boards take steps, insofar as reasonably feasible, to alleviate racial imbalance
in schools regardless of its cause." Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 31 Cal.
Rptr. 606, 609-10, 382 P2d 878, 881-82 (1963). On de-facto segregation and the
state's duty to desegregate, see Taylor v. Bd. of Educ. of New Rochelle, 191 F.Supp.
181 (S.D. N.Y. 1961) appeal dismissed as premature 288 F.2d 600 (2nd Cir. 1961)
final decree 195 F.Supp. 231 (S.D. N.Y. 1961), affd, 294 F.2d 36 (2nd Cir. 1961)
stay den. 82 Sup.Ct. 10 (1961), cert. den. 368 U.S. 940 (1961). For discussion, see
Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-The General Northern Problem, 58
Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 157 (1963).
48 Per Mr. Justice Harlan in dissent. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 34-36 (1956).
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discretionary appeals and appellate fees, or other costs of appeal, as
well. 4 These predictions have proved true. In Burns v. Ohio,4" the
Supreme Court held that Griffin applied to state collateral proceed-
ings, even where a criminal appeal was discretionary, rather than a
matter of right as it is in Illinois. This was held even though the
state had already provided one appellate review on the merits. In
Smith v. Bennett,46 the Supreme Court held that a state may not
require a payment of statutory filing fees by an indigent before his
appeal would be docketed.' Not so predictable was the Court's addi-
tional holding in Smith that the Griffin principle applied to civil cases,
at least insofar as to disallow a state from collecting a filing fee before
accepting a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Two less clear matters, left untouched in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Black in Griffin, seemed to have been responsible for Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's separate concurrence. On the one hand, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter was concerned that a state be allowed to protect itself
from frivolous appeals so that public moneys need not needlessly be
spent,4" and on the other hand, that the Griffin principle be given only
prospective and not retroactive vitality. 9 The latter question-retro-
activity-was resolved, at least in part, in 1958 when it was presented
to the United States Supreme Court in three cases, Eskridge," Ross,"'
and Woods," each coming from the State of Washington. The Ross
and Woods judgments were vacated and remanded in light of the
Court's disposition of Eskridge; hence, only the last case will be dis-
cussed here.
Eskridge, an indigent defendant, had been convicted in 1935, well
prior to the Griffin decision. As a general rule, the supreme court of
Washington will not consider an appeal unless the appellant provides
the court with a transcript of that portion of the trial in which the
44 See Qua, Griffin v. Illinois, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 143 (1957).
45 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
46365 U.S. 708 (1961).
47 "We hold that to interpose any financial consideration between an indigent
prisoner of the State and his exercise of a state right to sue for his liberty is to
deny that prisoner the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 709.
48 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1956) : A state "may protect itself [from]
frivolous appeals . . . The growing experience of reforms in appellate procedure and
sensible, economic modes for securing review still may be devised, may be drawn
upon to the end that the State will neither bolt the door to equal justice nor support
a wasteful abuse of the appellate process."
49 Id. at 25-26. See generally, Comment, The Prospective Decision--A Useful "Tool
of the Trade" 38 WASH. L. REv. 584 (1963).
50 Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S.
214 (1958).
51 Ross v. Schneckcloth, 357 U.S. 575 (1958).5 2 Woods v. Rhay, Id.
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alleged errors occurred. An appeal will be dismissed by the clerk of
the state supreme court upon three days' notice if the transcript is
not timely filed." Eskridge took a timely appeal and had also peti-
tioned for a free transcript under a Washington statute which allowed
the trial judge discretion to grant a transcript for an indigent's appeal,
"if in his opinion justice will thereby be promoted."5 The trial judge
denied Eskridge's petition who then petitioned the Washington su-
preme court for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to issue
him a free transcript for purposes of his appeal. The state supreme
court denied Eskridge's petition, and simultaneously granted the
state's motion to dismiss his appeal for failure to file a certified state-
ment of facts and a transcript of the record. Eskridge went to prison
without having had appellate review over the merits of his conviction.
After the Griffin decision, in 1956, Eskridge petitioned the Washington
supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the failure,
in 1935, to furnish him a free transcript had violated the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Although
the reporter's transcript from Eskridge's trial was still available, the
petition was denied without opinion, and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
By a vote of six to two, the Supreme Court reversed, issuing a per
curiam opinion. The Court held that the Griffin principle would be
given retroactive application:
In Griffin v. Illinois... we held that a State denies a constitutional
right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment if it allows all con-
victed defendants to have appellate review except those who cannot
afford to pay for the records of their trials. We hold that Washington
has denied this constitutional right here. The conclusion of the trial
judge that there was no reversible error in the trial cannot be an
adequate substitute for the right to full appellate review available to
all defendants in Washington who can afford the expense of a tran-
script. We do not hold that a State must furnish a transcript in every
case involving an indigent defendant. But here, as in the Griffin case,
we do hold that "destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate
appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy tran-
scripts." 5
5
, See Rule 46 (11) of Rules on Appeal, Appeal in Criminal Cases, RCW, Vol.
"0, Appeal-p. 26, and 34 A Wn.2d 50, 52-53.
rRCW 2.32.240.
55 Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S.
214, 216 (1958). Two dissenting Justices-Harlan and Whittaker-believed that the
Griftn case should not be given retrospective application. Mr. justice Frankfurter
took no part in the consideration or disposition of the case.
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Thus, it is clear that Griffin has a retroactive application. It was
argued in Eskridge that to apply Griffin retrospectively meant that the
courts would be inundated with petitions for release of indigent pri-
soners who would have to be set free and that the courts would stagger
under the magnitude of this administrative burden. However, four
years later, in Mapp v. Ohio,56 the Supreme Court, again faced with
the Eskridge contentions, but in another context, was able to say that
they had "later proved unfounded."5
It should be recalled that Eskridge had actually taken a timely
appeal and had promptly requested a transcript, thereby presenting a
strong case for retroactive application of Griffin. Nevertheless, it
would appear that a retroactive application will be made in all cases,
except for those cases of impossibility where no transcript of the trial
is available due to the death of the court reporter, so long as, at the
time of trial, an indigent accused had a lawyer, who, presumably,
continued his services for purposes of an appeal but failed to perfect
it."8 The reason is that to distinguish a pre-Griffin conviction where no
timely request for a transcript was made, from the Eskridge-type case
would necessarily invoke the waiver doctrine. The contention would
have to be that, by failing to request a transcript prior to the Griffin
case, an indigent defendant, having had knowledge of his constitutional
right, consciously waived it. This is a difficult position to maintain. 9
This latter situation should be carefully distinguished from those
post-Griffin convictions where indigent defendants fail to take a timely
appeal, after having been instructed on their constitutional right to a
transcript, or its equivalent. In this latter situation, the waiver doc-
trine would operate in those cases where an indigent defendant peti-
tions for a transcript after the time for his appeal has expired. The
Supreme Court has approved reasonable, non-discriminatory state
rules that require a criminal appeal to be taken within a stipulated
time, and has upheld state appellate court refusals to review non-
timely appeals."0 Hence, it would appear that states need not furnish
transcripts for appeals that they are not obligated to hear, so long as
an indigent defendant has been made fully aware of his rights and has,
consciously, made a knowing waiver of them.
56 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See Morris, The End of an Experiment in Federalisnz-A
Note on Mapp v. Ohio, 36 WAsH. L. REv. 407 (1961).
57 Id. at 659, note 9.
58 Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 423 (1963).
59 See, e.g., Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1940) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938).
60 See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 453-54, 482-86 (1933).
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A second cluster of problems, stemming from the Griffin case, group
themselves around the content of the constitutional standard there
announced, i.e., a state must afford destitute defendants "as adequate
appellate review as defendants who have money to buy transcripts." 1
What does the phrase "as adequate appellate review" require? Does
it require counsel on appeal as well as a transcript, or its equivalent,
and does it require other professional talents as well? 2
One aspect of this problem does appear to be clear. It is that the
type of review that an indigent actually receives will be tested for its
"adequacy" against that type of review that a non-indigent may
receive. This comparison necessarily must take place within the
boundaries of a single jurisdiction. Thus, one could reasonably expect
that the type of review which will meet the requirements of the
"adequacy" standard will vary from state to state, depending upon the
type of appellate review that a state makes available for the non-
indigent defendant who appeals." If this is true, then few generali-
zations can be expected to hold for all fifty states.
Nevertheless, one general point appears to be warranted. The Court
did not say that an indigent's review necessarily must be identical to
that of a non-indigent, but rather, it must be "as adequate and effec-
tive": 84
We do not hold, however, that Illinois must purchase a stenogra-
pher's transcript in every case where a defendant cannot buy it. The
Supreme Court may find other means of affording adequate and
effective review to indigent defendants. For example, it may be that
bystander's bills of exceptions or other methods of reporting trial
proceedings could be used in some cases.
The implication of the quote appears to be that for an indigent's review
to qualify as "adequate," there need only be a substantially equivalent
review to that afforded a non-indigent. Even so, in many states, such
as Washington, where, as a matter of state policy, a full and complete
review is afforded to non-indigents, it seems that a transcript will be
61 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). This wording also appears at pages
13 (twice), 16, 18 and 20.
02 See Comment, Right To Aid In Addition To Counsel For Indigent Criminal
Defendants, 47 MiNN. L. REv. 1054 (1963).
68 For example, it has been reported that Louisiana provides no court reporter to
make official trial transcripts. Comment, The Effect of Griffin v. Illinois on the States'
Administration of the Criminal Law, 25 U. CH. L. Rv. 161, 164, note 14 (1957).
Even so, it does not appear that Griffin would now require that Louisiana must use
transcripts for criminal appeal purposes; instead, Griffi, would require that indigent
review be as "adequate" as non-indigent review, both being without a transcript. The
same might be said of those states using bystander's bills.
04 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956).
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necessary for an indigent's review to qualify as "adequate and effec-
tive." The reason is that the other possible means, which can supply
a basis of review, other than a transcript, appear inadequate. For
example, if the alleged trial error is insufficiency of the evidence for
conviction, or one of improper admission of evidence, then, it is most
difficut to see how "adequate and effective appellate review" can take
place without a transcript of the actual proceedings. If the alleged
error is an erroneous instruction, then, surely, a bystander's bill, which
would not contain the actual wording of the instruction, could not
afford the basis for an "adequate and effective review."
These, and perhaps other, thoughts appear to have played a major
role in the thinking of the Illinois supreme court when Griffin was
before it on remand. That court ruled that a trial judge must supply
an indigent with a free transcript in all cases for purposes of a timely
appeal. 5 Thus, the Illinois court made two decisions: (1) that, when
compared with the review available to affluent appellants, transcripts
were required in indigent defendant cases to afford them as "adequate"
a review, and (2) that a trial judge should grant the transcript without
preliminarily passing on the merits of the issues which an indigent
defendant proposes to argue on appeal, and hence, the trial judge was
not required to pass on frivolous appeals.
The second solution of the Illinois rules-frivolous appeals-was
originally resolved differently by the Washington supreme court. It
will be recalled that one of the cases remanded to the Washington
court in light of the Esridge decision was Woods v. Rhay. In 1959,
the Washington supreme court used that case as a vehicle for the
formulation of a new set of rules to govern trial judges in passing upon
indigent's requests for free stenographic transcripts.66 These rules
contemplated a hearing before a trial judge, usually the one who tried
the case. The rules empower the judge to order a transcript, or a
portion thereof, or a narrative statement; or, conversely, he is allowed
to deny an indigent defendant's motion altogether, because in his
opinion, the alleged errors are frivolous. Thus, Washington's rules
allowed the trial court judge to pass on the merits of the proposed
appeal. The application of these rules gave rise to Draper v. Washing-
ton,67 decided on March 18, 1963.
65 111 Rev. Stat., ch. 110, § 101.65-1, 1957, (Transcripts for Indigent Defendants-
Sup. Ct. Rule, 65-1), and see the favorable commentary on this rule in Allen, Griffin
v. Illinois, 25 U. Cnr. L. REv. 151, 158 (1957).
66 Woods v. Rhay, 54 Wn.2d 36, 44-5, 338 P.2d 332, 337 (1959).
67 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
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On September 14, 1960, Draper and Lorentzen were convicted on
two counts of robbery, and, later, their motion for a new trial was
denied. On October 20, 1960, acting as counsel pro se, they filed a
timely notice of appeal and a motion requesting that the trial judge
order the preparation of a free transcript. They set forth twelve alle-
gations of error in the trial proceedings. Counsel was appointed for
the hearing on the petition for a transcript. He elaborated on the
objections, arguing that the foundation for the introduction of certain
items of evidence was inadequate, that the state had failed to prove
the existence of the corporation allegedly robbed, and had failed to
prove the possessory right of its agent to the money which allegedly
had been taken, and finally, that petitioners' contention that the evi-
dence was insufficient to sustain the conviction, was under the rules of
Woods v. Rhay, enough, in itself, to entitle them to a transcript. The
trial court denied petitioners' motion, entering an order, coupled with
formal findings of fact and conclusions of law, stating:
"That the assignments of error as set out by each defendant are
patently frivolous; that the guilt of each defendant.., was established
by overwhelming evidence, and that accordingly the furnishing of a
statement of facts would result in a waste of public funds." 8
Draper and Lorentzen sought review of the trial court's order in
the Washington supreme court. That court held that the rules formu-
lated in Woods v. Rhay had been applied properly and that the trial
court had correctly rejected each of the twelve assignments of error,
finding the appeal to be frivolous. 9
It is important to be absolutely clear about the materials before the
Washington supreme court when it made this decision. It did not have
before it any portion of the stenographic transcript of the actual jury
trial on the robbery charges. The only record before the state supreme
court was the one made at the hearing on the motion for a free tran-
script. On this basis, and without looking to the record actually made
at trial on the merits, the supreme court concluded that the contentions
on the merits of the case, which had been raised by petitioners in their
appeal, were frivolous. It is clear then, that the Washington supreme
court expressly had approved a scheme whereby an indigent's appeal
was preliminarily tested for its substantive merits, before a transcript
would be made available. But, when testing an appeal for its frivolity,
neither the trial judge nor the state supreme court could base judgment
68 Id. at 493.
69 Draper v. State, 58 Wn.2d 830, 365 P2d 31 (1961).
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on a transcript; nor, under the Washington procedure, could an indi-
gent, Draper, have recourse to a transcript to prepare for the hearing.
This procedure, of course, placed counsel and the courts, in an awk-
ward position, for, as the late Judge Jerome Frank put it: "But how
can the existence of such a meritorous appeal be shown unless the
defendant has access to a transcript of the events at the trial? 7 *
Furthermore, if a free transcript is denied by a trial judge because,
in his opinion, the alleged errors are frivolous, it becomes a particularly
difficult task for the Washington supreme court to determine, without
a transcript before it, whether the trial judge was guilty of an abuse
of discretion.
There is another important consideration which lay dormant in the
case. It is that, although Washington's procedure tested an indigent's
criminal appeal for frivolity, there is no similar provision applying to
non-indigent appeals. When an appellant is financially able to buy a
full transcript of the trial proceedings, the Washington supreme court
grants a full appellate review of these proceedings, regardless of what
the trial judge may think of the substantive merits of the appeal.7
In fact, the Washington rules applying to affluent appellants who
appeal criminal cases, do not afford trial judges an opportunity to
express their views on the merits of an appeal.7
On review of the Draper case, the United States Supreme Court, by
vote of five to four, reversed. Mr. Justice Goldberg delivered the opin-
ion of the Court.7 The basic holding was "that the conclusion of the
trial judge that an indigent's appeal is frivolous is a[n] ... inadequate
substitute for the full appellate review available to nonindigents in
Washington, when the effect of that finding is to prevent an appellate
examination based upon a sufficiently complete record of the trial pro-
ceedings themselves."7 4 In short, the Washington procedure had not
produced materials which constituted a "record of sufficient complete-
ness" for "adequate consideration of the errors assigned.'
5
70 United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 569 (2d Cir. 1956) (dissenting opinion).
71 Rule 46, Rules On Appeal, Appeals In Criminal Cases, RCW, Vol. "0," Appeal-
pp. 24-26, 34 A Wn.2d 50-53.
72 Rule 46(4), Rules on Appeal, Appeals In Criminal Cases, RCW, Vol. "0,"
Appeal-p. 25, 34 A Wn.2d 50, 51.
73 The majority consisted of Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Messrs. Justice Black,
Douglas, Brennan and Goldberg.
74 Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 499-500 (1963). "By allowing the trial
court to prevent petitioners from having stenographic support or its equivalent for
presentation of each of their separate contentions to the appellate tribunal, the State
of Washington has denied them the rights assured them by this Court's decisions in
Griffin and Eskridge." Id. at 497-98.
75 Id. at 497. The four dissenting Justices-White, Clark, Stewart and Harlan-
could not "fathom why and in what respects the record placed before the Washington
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It should be pointed out that the rules set forth in Woods v. Rhay
were not held unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court
dearly indicated that a state can protect itself from frivolous appeals,
and that Washington's rules could be constitutionally administered.
If there had been a showing that a narrative statement, or that only
a portion of the transcript, would have been adequate to consider the
alleged errors, then that showing would have been constitutionally
sufficient. What was impermissible was to administer the frivolous
appeal rule in such a way as totally to deny indigents any means .of
getting adequate review on the substantive merits of their case by
the state supreme court, when no such clog attended the appeals of
defendants having money. Thus, it is clear that the Griffin plrinciple
does allow a state to sift out frivolous appeals, but it appears that the
practice cannot be applied solely to indigent appeals: "if the appeals
of both indigents and non-indigents are to be tested for frivolity, they
[must] be tested on the same basis by the reviewing court. 7 6
In spite of the above, the Washington rules do create problems.
They contemplate that indigent appeals will be sifted for their fri-
volity, but there is nothing in Washington's rules, governing the
criminal appellate process, that allows a non-indigent's appeal to be
tested for frivolity. Thus, on this basis alone, it would appear that
the rules of Woods v. Rhay are inherently discriminatory and violative
of the Griffin principle. Secondly, there remains a question of state
constitutional law. It is doubtful whether any organ of government
in Washington can constitutionally be given power to sift criminal
appeals and deny any person's criminal appeal because of its frivolity.
The reason is that Washington's Constitution, on its face, clearly ap-
plies to all cases, including frivolous ones: "In criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall have .. .the right to appeal in all cases. ....,
Thus, the rules of Woods v. Rhay raise substantial state and federal
constitutional questions.
The basic division of the Supreme Court in the Draper case was
over what properly might constitute a "record of sufficient complete-
ness" necessary for adequate appellate review. The majority cited,
Supreme Court was not wholly satisfactory.., since Griffin, and other cases, would
permit an indigent's appeal on the basis of a bystander's bill or a trial judge's minutes.
Id. at 500.
7 Id. at 499. The Court was clear on this matter: "... nothing we say today
militates against a State's formulation and application of operatively non-discrimina-
tory rules to both indigents and nonindigents in order to guard against frivolous
appeals . . ." See, Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958), and Coppedge v.
United States, 369 U.S. 438, 447-48 (1962).
77 WAsH. CoNsT., art. 1, § 22 and amend. X.
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and approved, a federal case, Coppedge v. United States,"8 and Cop-
pedge may well come to govern frivolous appeals. That case decided
what standard must be applied by lower federal courts when they pass
upon an indigent defendant's petition for leave to appeal. Present
federal law has made a criminal appeal, in effect, a matter of right, 9
but indigent defendants must petition for a free transcript in order to
perfect their appeal. They are entitled to a transcript if the federal
district court will certify that their appeal is "taken in good faith."8
"A defendant's good faith . . . [is] demonstrated when he seeks
appellate review of any issue not frivolous."'" Hence, the standard
governing frivolity is crucial. That standard, simply stated, is that
an indigent's appeal is to be considered frivolous only if the appeal
would be dismissed in the case of a non-indigent litigant." In the
course of its opinion in Coppedge, the Court cited the Griffin case
and explicitly stated that the Coppedge holding had "been impelled
by considerations beyond the corners" of the federal statutes in order
to assure "equal treatment for every litigant before the bar."83 Thus,
its equation of frivolity with the test for dismissing non-indigent cases
would appear to be part of the Griffin principle. Furthermore, the
Court indicated that it "is not the burden of the petitioner to show
that his appeal has merit."84 Rather, the burden is on the government
"to show that the appeal is so lacking in merit that the court would
dismiss the case . . .had the case been docketed and a record been
filed by an appellant able to afford the expense of complying with
those requirements."8
Thus, given the Coppedge decision, Draper, and certain other con-
siderations, set forth above, it would appear that the rules promul-
gated in Woods v. Rhay should be reconsidered.
If we recall that the Griffin principle requires that destitute defen-
dants be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who
have money to buy transcripts, and if we recall that Eskridge was to
the effect that a trial judge's conclusion that an appeal lacks merit
78369 U.S. 438 (1962).
9 Id. at 441; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1294; Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 37 (a) Cf. Carrol
v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 400-01 (1957).
80 28 U.S.C. 1915 (a). For the earlier federal practice see, e.g., Estabrook v. King,
119 F.2d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 1941) ; United States v. Fair, 235 Fed. 1015 (N.D. Cal.
1916.)
81 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
82 Id. at 447, citing Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958).83Id. at 446.
8 Id. at 448.
85 Ibid. However, counsel for an indigent need not prosecute an appeal that he
honestly considers to be frivolous. See Ellis v. United States, 357 U.S. 374 (1958).
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cannot substitute for the right to full appellate review, then Lane v.
Brown, also decided on March 18, 1963, will fall into place. It in-
volved the complete denial of an indigent's appeal in collateral attack
proceedings by a person who was not a part of the state judiciary.
Indiana permits an appeal from a denial of a writ of error coram
nobis,87 but it also requires that a transcript be filed in such an appeal
before jurisdiction to hear the appeal in conferred upon the appellate
court.8 Under Indiana's public defender act of 1945,0 only the public
defender, in his discretion, could order a transcript of a coram- nobis:
hearing for an indigent's appeal. An indigent could not obtain a
transcript for himself and appeal pro se, nor could he obtain a tran-
script if a lawyer other than the public defender would agree to
prosecute his appeal.90 The upshot of the Indiana procedure governing
coram nobis appeals was that a person with sufficient funds could
appeal as a matter of right from a denial of a writ of error coram
nobis, but an indigent defendant could not because, in the discretion
of the public defender, the indigent could be cut off entirely from a
transcript, and hence from any appeal at all.
Brown was convicted of murder by an Indiana trial court and was
sentenced to death. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed, 1 and the
United States Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari. Thereafter,
Brown filed a petition for habeas corpus in the federal district court
which dismissed the petition due to Brown's failure to exhaust state
remedies. Brown then filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis
in the state trial court; it denied relief. Brown then asked that the
public defender perfect an appeal to the Indiana supreme court, ap-
pealing the denial of the writ of coram nobis. This request was reject-
ed on the sole ground that the public defender believed the appeal
would be unsuccessful. Brown then moved the state trial court for a
transcript of the coram nobis hearing and the appointment of counsel
to perfect an appeal. This motion was denied by the trial court, and the
decision was affirmed by the supreme court of Indiana. Certiorari was
so 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
87 On coram nobis, see, Note, The Writ of Coram Nobis In Washington, 22 WAsH.
L. R w. 64 (1947), and see generally, Amandes, Corarn Nobis-Panacea or Carcinoma,
7 HASTINGS L.J. 48 (1955).
88 See McCrary v. State, 241 Ind. 518, 533-34, 173 N.E2d 300, 307 (1961) wherein
there appears a reproduction and discussion of Rule 2-40 of the Indiana supreme court.
80 Indiana Acts 1945, ch. 38, §§ 1-5, Burns Ind. Ann. Stat., 1956, §§ 13-1401-1405.
00 See Willoughby v. State, 242 Ind. 183, 177 N.E.2d 465 (1961); Jackson v.
Reeves, 238 Ind. 708, 153 N.E.2d 604 (1958); State ex rel. Casey v. Murray, 231
Ind. 74, 106 N.E2d 911 (1952).91 Brown v. State, 239 Ind. 184, 154 N.E.2d 720 (1958).
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denied by the United States Supreme Court; however, it indicated
that the appropriate procedure was to file a petition for habeas corpus
in the federal district court. Brown then instituted habeas corpus
proceedings in the district court, which were reviewed by the United
States Supreme Court.
The Court was unanimous in its judgment that Indiana's procedure
violated the fourteenth amendment; however, the vote split seven to
two 2 on whether the due process or the equal protection clause had
been violated. In delivering the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Stew-
art pointed out that Indiana's procedure violated the equal protection
clause, stating that the "provision before us confers upon a state officer
outside the judicial system power to take from an indigent all hope of
any appeal at all ... [this] procedure, based on indigency alone, does
not meet constitutional standards."93 In light of Eskridge, this decision
appears to follow the expected development of the Griffin principle.
Thus, in summary, it can be said that, in all indigent criminal ap-
peals, whether they be direct appeals or appeals from collateral pro-
ceedings, and in all civil appeals from a denial of a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, a state has a constitutional duty to provide an in-
digent defendant with a trial record of sufficient completeness to ensure
that subsequent appellate review will be as adequate and effective as
that review made available to affluent defendants. This constitutional
duty includes an actual review by the appellate tribunal itself, and it is
not permissible to substitute some other agency.
INDIGENCY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In American legal practices the right to counsel is considered
"fundamental." 9 Counsel is necessary if fairness is to prevail, and
if our adversary system is to work." Thus, counsel is considered to
92 In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Clark stated
that he believed that the due process clause had been violated and that if Indiana
would allow a review of the public defender's decision not to appeal the denial of
coram nobis, then the due process clause would be satisfied.
93 Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 485 (1963). "The present case falls clearly
within the area staked out by the Court's decisions in Griffin, Burns, Smith and
Eskridge. To be sure, this case does not involve, as did Griffin, a direct appeal from
a criminal conviction, but Smith makes clear that the Griffin principle also applies
to state collateral proceedings, and Burns leaves no doubt that the principle applies
even though the State has already provided one review on the merits." Id. at 484-85.
94 "A defendant needs a lawyer as urgently as a sick man needs a doctor, and in
many instances even more urgently, for while nature often heals the sick without
outside aid, it seems to have little concern for the plight of the accused." FELLMAN,
THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS 112 (1958).
95 "The requirement of specific charges, their proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the
protection of the accused from confessions extorted through whatever form of police
pressures, the right to a prompt hearing before a magistrate, the right to assistance
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be part of the institutional framework. As the United States Supreme
Court has put it: "A layman is usually no match for the skilled
prosecutor whom he confronts in the courtroom. He needs the aid -of
counsel lest he be the victim of overzealous prosecutors, of the law's
complexity, or of his own ignorance or bewilderment."". The presence
of counsel expedites matters-for example, counsel' frequently elicits
a plea of guilty, recognizing the futility of litigation, at a considerable
saving of tax funds." For these, and other, reasons, developments in
the constitutional right to counsel are of paramount significance. Con-
sequently, cases such as Gideon v. Wainwrigkt, 8 and Douglas v.
California," decided March 18, 1963, significantly articulating an
indigent's constitutional rights to counsel, should be welcomed and
analyzed within the requirements of fairness and the necessities -of
the adversary system. Although the subject has .been .canVassed -be-
fore,... a bit of background on the right to counsel is necessary to set
the Gideon and Douglas cases in perspective.
The common law of England, contrary to its solicitousness for the
right to trial by jury,'0' was not protective Of an accused's. right to
counsel, until comparatively recently. And, interestingly, .when the
of counsel, to be supplied by government when circumstances make it necessary, the
duty to advise an accused of his constitutional rights-these are all characteristics of
the accusatorial system and manifestations of its demands." Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 54 (1949).
06 Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 476 (1945). "Of all the ights that an accused
person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for
it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have." Schaefer, Federalism
and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1956).
97 "Thus, in the Northern District of Illinois in fiscal 1961, an initial plea of guilty
was entered by approximately 75% of all defendants represented by assigned counsel
whereas the figure was -about 20% in cases represented by private. counsel., In the
District of Connecticut the figures for the same years were 60% and 41%. In fiscal
1960 and 1961 the figures were 75% and 53% in the San Francisco Division of the
Northern District of California, 53% and 45% in the Sacranento. Division." The
Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Criminal Justice,
Report, 29 (1963). In fiscal year 1960 there were 26,728 criminal convictions in the
federal district courts where an indigent's right to counsel has long been guaranteed,
and 24,245 convictions resulted from guilty pleas. 1960 Director of The Ad. Office
of The U.S. Courts Ann. Rep. 304.
0s 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
09 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
100 See, e.g., BEANEY, THE_ RIGHT TO COUNSEL. iN AmmncAN COURTS (1955) ; FELL.-
MAN, THaE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS, Ch. 7 (1958) ; Attorney General's Committee on
Poverty and the Admninistration of Criminal Justice,' Report, 12-57 (1963); Kamisar,
The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 U. Cnr. L. Rxv. 1 (1962);
The Riqht to Counsel: A Symposium, 45 MINN. L. REv. 693 (1961).
101 Even here one may have some qualms because a jury verdict of not guilty
sometimes subjected the jurors to severe penalties. For example, the reporter omi-
nously added at the end of the proceedings of the trial of John Lilburne: "The jury
having acquitted him were summoned before the Council of State, on the 23rd of
August, 1653; in pursuance of an order of parliament, of the 21st, to ,answelr for
their conduct." Trial of John Lilburne. 5 Howell's State Trials 407, 444 (1653).
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English did provide for counsel, they did so in misdemeanor cases,
the least serious in the criminal law.1"' It appears that the reason
accounting for this development was that the government's desire
for convictions in petty offenses was so minimal that it could well
afford .to be charitable towards the accused.103 Prior to 1695, the date
parliament partially remedied the situation,' a person accused of the
serious crime of treason had no right to be represented by counsel.05
Apart from treason trials,0 6 and in all other felony prosecutions, the
accused did not have a clear legal right to counsel until a parliamen-
tary enactment in 1836.10' The Act of 1836 simply permitted de-
fendants in felony cases the right to hire counsel, if they had sufficient
funds. It was not until 1903 that parliament provided that counsel
could be appointed for indigents accused of felony. 8
In the United States, every state constitution, except Virginia where
the right is supplied by case decision,' contains a provision that a
defendant in a criminal case, has a right to hire counsel for his de-
fense. 10 These provisions date from the colonial period,"' or from
the time of a state's- admission to the Union."2 The provision of the
sixth amendment to the United States Constitution," 3 ratified in 1791,
completes the historical picture in the United States, showing that an
102 See I STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND 341 (1883).
103 Id. at 397-99 where Stephen points out the superior position of the crown in
criminal trials other than the petty offenses of battery, libel and perjury, etc.
1047 and 8 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1 (1695). Parliament did two things: (1) It permitted
the accused to retain counsel of his own choosing, and (2) if an accused were not
represented, it required a court to appoint counsel, not exceeding two. It appears
that all members of parliament were potential targets of a treason trial and, it seems,
that they were particularly interested in a fair criminal proceeding for those cases
in which they might be personally involved.
305 For discussion see BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8-14
(1955).
106 Or misprison of treason.
107 6 and 7, Will. 4, c. 114, § 1 (1836). By a fiction, applying only to some cases,
the courts did allow counsel on occasion, to argue issues of law, but in no case was
counsel allowed to argue or to speak to the jury. See, I STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE
CRIMrNAL LAW IN ENGLAND 424 (1883).
10s3 Edw. 7, ch. 38, § 1 (1903) (Poor Prisoners' Defense Act), as amended by 20
and 21 Geo. 5, ch. 32 (1930) and 12 and 13 Geo. 6, ch. 51 (1949) (The Legal Aid And
Advice Act, applying primarily, to civil, and not criminal, matters).
109 See Cottrell v. Commonwealth 187 Va. 351, 46 S.E2d 413 (1948) ; Barnes v.
Commonwealth, 92 Va. 794, 23 S.E. 784 (1895).
110 See Fellman, The Right to Counsel Under State Law, 1955 Wis. L. REv. 281.
III E.g, New Jersey's constitution of 1776 provided that the accused "shall be per-
mitted to the same privileges of witnesses and counsel, as their prosecutors are, or
shall be entitled to." For discussion see JOURNAL OF THE COURTS OF COMMON RIGHT
AND CHANCERY OF EAST NEW JERSEY 130 (Edsall ed. 1937).
112 E.g., Washington, "In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right
to appear and defend in person, and by counsel,..." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22;
WASH. CONST. amend. X.
111 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
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accused has always been allowed to be represented by retained coun-
sel." 4 Thus, an accused's right to counsel is considered fundamental by
state and nation alike. It should be noted, however, that this right
has traditionally been the right to retain counsel, and the very im-
portant qualification of money has severely limited an accused indi-
gent's right to counsel. Historically, the right to assigned counsel has
been distinguished from the right to hire counsel and has progressed
differently in the federal and state court systems. The origin of the
constitutional right of an indigent accused to be supplied with counsel
is more recent than the right to retain counsel although, obviously, it
can be no less important either to the achievement of "fairness," or
to the requirements of the adversary system."'
A good beginning point for analysis of the federal practice is 1938.
A strong and clear statement of an indigent's right to counsel in all
federal criminal cases came with Johnson v. Zerbst."' This federal
case, a landmark in the criminal law, interpreted the sixth amendment,
and its substance has been incorporated into Rule 44 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure: "If the defendant appears in court
without counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to counsel and
assign counsel to represent him at every stage of the proceeding unless
he elects to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel." This
right of an indigent accused is far-reaching because the Supreme Court
has indicated that if an indigent is subjected to trial without counsel,
and if he has not knowingly, and thereby effectively, waived his right
thereto, then, the trial court loses jurisdiction to proceed; and if a
conviction should occur under these circumstances, then the judgment
is void. This last point means that a defendant imprisoned as a result
of such a judgment would be entitled to release by way of habeas
corpus. The Supreme Court summarized Johnson v. Zerbst this way:"1 7
If the accused, however, is not represented by counsel and has not
competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth
Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and
sentence depriving him of his life or liberty. A court's jurisdiction at
114 For a tracing and comparison of the historical roots see Becker & Heidelbaugh,
The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases-An Inquiry Into the History and Practice
in England and America, 28 NOTRE DAntE LAW 351 (1953).
21' See generally, Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment,
20 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1944).
116 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
11Id. at 468. On what amounts to a waiver "intelligently and competently" made,
see Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941); Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C.
Cir. 1942); Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); Von Moltke v. Gillies,
332 U.S. 708 (1948). But compare Cooke v. Swope, 28 F.Supp. 492 (W.D. Wash.
1939) aff'd 109 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1940).
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the beginning of a trial may be lost "in the course of the proceedings"
due to failure to complete the court-as the Sixth Amendment re-
quires-by providing counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain
counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty,
and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth
Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction
to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court with-
out jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain
release by habeas corpus. A judge of the United States-to whom a
petition for habeas corpus is addressed-should be alert to examine
"the facts for himself when if true as alleged they make the trial
absolutely void."
Thus, the right of an indigent accused to have counsel provided at all
stages during a federal criminal trial is assured by the sixth amend-
ment."8 This right includes representation in federal criminal appeals
as well." 9
Note that the federal constitutional guaranty protects an indigent's
right to effective counsel.' The meaning of this requirement is that
the constitutional guaranty "contemplates that such assistance be
untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one
lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests.... Further-
more, "representation in the role of an advocate is required."' 2  But
"effective assistance of counsel" does not require that court-assigned
counsel be happily acceptable to an accused, and it is not prejudicial
error for a district court to refuse to allow assigned counsel to with-
draw.' However, where a federal court fails to inquire into the
nature of serious disagreements between the accused and assigned
counsel, a denial of the right to effective assistance occurs. 2 4  An
indigent's right to effective counsel is obviously impaired if counsel is
incompetent, and incompetency can cause a reversal of a conviction. 5
11 See Fellman, The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Courts, 30 NEB.
L. REv. 559 (1951).
119 Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957) ; Ellis v. United States, 356
U.S. 674 (1958). See also Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). There
may still be times during the appellate stage, such as the period between conviction
and appointment of appeal counsel, when an indigent is left on his own to get the
necessary appeal papers timely filed. See discussion in Boskey, The Right to Counsel
in Appellate Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REv. 783 (1961).
120 See BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 115-126 (1955).
Washington is in accord; see State v. Cory, 382 P.2d 1019 (Wash. 1963).
121 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
122 Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958).
123 United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 234 (2nd Cir. 1950) ; United States v.
Gutterman, 147 F.2d 540 (2nd Cir. 1945).
"24 McDonald v. Johnston, 62 F.Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal. 1945), revd 157 F.2d 275
(9th Cir. 1946), cert. den. 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
'25 Johnson v. United States, 110 F.2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1940); see Jones v. Huff,
152 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
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However, the general rule in the federal courts is that a licensed prac-
titioner is presumed competent placing a heavy burden on the accused
to prove otherwise. 2 '
Prior to March 18, 1963, the constitutional right to counsel of
indigent defendants tried in state courts was complex and uncertain.
Three states, Indiana,"' Kentucky, 28 and New Jersey,"9 have state
constitutions which require the appointment of counsel for indigent
defendants in criminal cases; the remainder appear silent. The statutes
of the fifty states vary considerably. Thirty-five states require ap-
pointment of counsel for indigents in capital and non-capital felony
cases; the remaining fifteen states either appoint counsel only in
capital cases, or make no explicit provision for the appointment of
counsel, or leave the matter to the discretion of the trial judge. 3
Washington's statutes' indicate that "if the defendant appear
without counsel, he shall be informed by the court that it is his right
to have counsel before being arraigned ... 2"", The Washington
supreme court has held, similar to other courts, 3 ' in furtherance of
the constitutional guarantee of counsel, that this statutory section im-
poses four duties upon a trial judge. Whenever a defendant appears
in court without counsel, a trial court judge must: (1) ascertain
whether the defendant is incapable of employing counsel because of
his poverty; if so, (2) he must fully inform the defendant of his
right to have appointed counsel at public expense; (3) he must ask
whether the defendant desires the aid of such counsel, and, in any
event, (4) he is responsible for the record clearly showing that the
first three steps have been taken.'
In addition to state constitutional and statutory provisions, the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution binds the
states to afford counsel to indigent defendants in certain circumstances.
Prior to Gideon v. Wainright,"5 which incorporated the sixth amend-
-126 See, e.g., Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F2d 962 (10th Cir. 1941); Hagan v.
United States, 9 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1925) ; Diggs v. Welch, 148 F2d 667 (D.C. Cir.
1945), cert. den., 325 U.S. 889 (1945). In Washington see State v. Bird, 31 Wn.2d
777, 198 P.2d 978 (1948).12 INDIANA CONST. art. 1., § 13.
128 KENTUCKY CONST. § 11.
.129 NEW JERSEY CONST. art. I, § 10.
130 See the appendix to the opinion of Mr. justice Douglas in McNeal v. Culver,
365 U.S. 109, 119 (1961).
'31 RCW 10.40.030 and RCW 10.01.110.
"32 Ibid.
"' E.g., People v. Hunt 258 App. Div. 24, 16 N.Y.S2d 19 (1939).
'34 See Wakefield v. Rhay, 57 Wn2d 168, 356 P.2d 596 (1960) ; Aichele v. Rhay, 57
Wn.2d 178, 356 P.2d 326 (1960) ; Wilken v. Squier, 50 Wn2d 58, 309 P2d 746 (1957).
135 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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ment into the fourteenth, the fourteenth amendment's guarantee was
fluid, flowing from its due process clause. However, it now appears
that, because of Gideon, an indigent's right to counsel will be par-
ticularized by the configurations of federal precedent construing the
sixth amendment. It is conducive to understanding to sketch the
constitutional background of the Gideon case.
It is elementary that the first ten amendments to the United States
Constitution impose limitations upon the federal government and do
not restrict the states unless those provisions have been made binding
upon the states by their having been incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment.'86 The criterion of incorporation is "that a provision of
the Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental and essential to a fair trial'
is made obligatory upon the States by the fourteenth amendment.' 137
That is, the fourteenth amendment embraces those fundamental prin-
ciples of liberty and justice which lie at the base of our civil and politi-
cal institutions, even though they specifically have been dealt with in
another part of the Constitution of the United States. 8 Thus, the
first amendment's freedoms of speech, press, religion, assembly, asso-
ciation and petition for redress of grievances have all been incorpor-
ated. 9 Similarly, the fifth amendment's command that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, 4 '
the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures,'' and the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment,'42 are all binding upon the states. What has been the
development regarding the sixth amendment's guarantee of counsel?
136 Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U.S. 1833) ; but note the views expressed in
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
137 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
138 Id. at 341. The test of "fundamental" is often repeated: "Rights implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) ; "Princi-
ples of justice so rooted in the traditions and consciences of our people as to be ranked
fundamental." Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936) ; "Principles of liberty
and justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions." Hebert v.
Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926), and see Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99
(1908).
139 See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (speech and press)
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (speech and press) ; Staub v. Baxley, 355
U.S. 313, 321 (1958) (speech) ; Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936)
(press) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (religion) ; De Jonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (assembly) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486,
488 (1960) (association) ; Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296
(1961) (association) ; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (speech, assem-
bly and petition for redress of grievances).
140 See, e.g., Chicago, B & Q. R., v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-241 (1897), and
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 522-26 (1898).
141 See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-8 (1949) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655 (1961), and Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
142 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
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A convenient starting point is 1932 and the celebrated Scottsboro
case, Powell v. Alabama."3 Nine Negro boys, 13 to 21, were taken
off a train and charged with the capital crime of having raped two
white girls who were hoboing their way from Chattanooga to Hunts-
ville, Alabama. One of the boys "was almost totally blind. One had
a facial twist that had contorted his features into an insane grin. Four
of them were mental defectives of the lowest possible intelligence.
Only three of them could read or write at all. All were uneducated,
underfed and unhealthy."' 4 On the trial morning, and not before, the
trial judge appointed an iconoclastic lawyer, Mr. Milo Moody, to
represent the nine defendants who were then convicted. Their con-
victions were affirmed on direct appeal.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, by vote of seven to
two," 5 holding "that in a capital case, where the defendant is unable
to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own
defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like,
it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel
for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty
is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such
circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the prepara-
tion and trial of the case.""'  Thus, an indigent's right to effective,
not ritualistic, counsel was part of due process of law, but, on the facts
of Powell, that right was limited to capital, and did not extend to all
felony cases."' The question arose whether Powell would be extended
to all criminal cases, including felonies and misdemeanors, or whether
it would be restricted in some way.
An answer to this question came with the Court's decision in Betts
v. Brady,"" holding that under the due process clause, a state need
not necessarily supply counsel to an indigent in every non-capital,
felony offense. In spite of the widespread protection of the right to
counsel by state and nation, the Court rejected a contention that the
sixth amendment's right-to-counsel provision was "fundamental and
143 287 U.S. 45 (1932). For graphic accounts of this case see, REYNOLDS, COURTROOM
248-314 (1950) and CHALMERS, THEY SHALL BE FREE (1951).
144 REYNOLDS, COURTROOM 257 (1950) quoted in Fellman, The Federal Right to
Counsel in State Courts, 31 NEB. L. Ran. 15, 16-17 (1952).
145 The two dissenting justices agreed that the due process clause required that an
indigent be afforded the effective assistance of counsel, but they disagreed with the
majority, holding that defendants had received the required representation.
146 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
147 For discussion of the capital vs. non-capital distinction see Bute v. Illinois, 333
U.S. 640 (1948).
148 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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essential to a fair trial," and therefore, binding upon the states. In-
stead, the Court stated that, "the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
the conviction and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the
common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right, and while want
of counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction lacking in
such fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the amendment em-
bodies an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any
court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who
is not represented by counsel."' 49
Betts v. Brady, then, came down to something like this. The four-
teenth amendment did not incorporate the sixth amendment's guaran-
tee of counsel, but it did require that counsel be offered to every
indigent defendant in all capital cases because, in such cases, the
presence of counsel was "fundamental and essential to a fair trial."
However, counsel need not be afforded indigent defendants in all non-
capital felony cases because, in such cases, counsel was not "funda-
mental and essential;" but, counsel was deemed "fundamental and
essential to a fair trial" in certain non-capital felony cases which con-
tained "special circumstances." Thus, the question in every non-
capital case was whether "special circumstances" were present: Did
an indigent defendant receive a "fair trial"? "Special circumstances"
could be presented, but need not necessarily be presented, by an indi-
gent defendant's youth, degree of ignorance, mental capacity, ex-
perience, or by the nature of the events transpiring at trial.5 This
ad-hoc determination was to be "tested by an appraisal of the totality
of facts in a given case.' 1.
The futility of this position has long been apparent. The "fair trial"
doctrine, with its emphasis on "special circumstances," placed a state
trial judge in an untenable position. It placed upon him the duty to
ascertain, before trial, whether he should appoint counsel for an indi-
gent defendant in order to afford him a fair trial; but, the "fairness"
of the trial, and hence the judge's duty to appoint counsel, was tested
by the "totality of facts" occurring during the trial which necessarily
had to be viewed after the trial had ended. Thus, in order to discharge
his duties faithfully, a state trial judge was called upon to be omnis-
14' Id. at 473.
150 For discussion of applications of the fair-trial doctrine, see BEANEY, THE RIGHT
TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 160-99 (1955).
151 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942). In Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134,
139 (1947) the Court said, "Our duty does not go beyond safeguarding 'rights essential
to a fair hearing' by the states."
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cient because the Betts v. Brady doctrine expected him to know the
results of a trial before it took place.'52
In addition, the fluidity of the fair-trial doctrine encouraged pris-
oners in all the state prisons to petition for review in the hope that
their case would be found to contain "special circumstances" and
result in reversal. Thus, there came a flood of petitions for writs of
habeas corpus. It is now clear that Betts v. Brady created more
problems than it solved. Scholars predicted that it would be over-
ruled;.. 3 hence, it came as no surprise" when the Supreme Court,
last year, granted certiorari in the Gideon case, requesting counsel to
argue this question: "Should this Court's holding in Betts v. Brady
. ..be reconsidered?"' 5
Gideon, an indigent, was tried for a non-capital felony offense. He
had timely requested counsel, but was refused because counsel could
be assigned only in capital cases under the state law. Gideon con-
ducted his own defense, and after conviction, petitioned the state
supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus which was denied. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court. He
noted that the facts of Betts v. Brady were "strikingly like the facts
upon which Gideon here bases his federal constitutional claim.""'
Thus, the two cases could not be distinguished. The opinion then
proceeds to declare that the right to counsel is "fundamental and
essential to a fair trial" and that "Betts was wrong, however, in con-
cluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not one
of those fundamental rights."' Twenty-two states entered the case
1 52See the discussion of this problem in Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949).
156 E.g., BEANEY, THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF CouNsEL IN FUNDA!JENTAL LAW
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 39 (1959).
154 In Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) four dissenting Justices-Brennan,
Black, Douglas and Mr. Chief Justice Warren-repudiated Betts v. Brady. In Spano
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) Mr. Justice Stewart showed that he had doubts
about the doctrine. A logical extension of Spano would indicate that retained counsel
has a right to be present whenever an accused is questioned by the government after
indictment, except where that right has been knowingly waived. See People v. Water-
man, 9 N.Y2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445 (1961), and People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y2d 544, 166
N.E.2d 825 (1960). In addition, the serious nature of a felony charge and the complex
technicalities of its issues were held sufficient under the doctrine to require counsel.
See Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1961), and Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S.
506 (1962). Hence, by 1962, the fair-trial rule was little more than an anachronism
because the Court had adopted the position that it was almost impossible for an indi-
gent layman to defend himself without thereby working a denial of due process of law.
1'5 Gideon v. Cochran, 370 U.S. 908 (1962).
156 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 338 (1963).
157 Id. at 342. "The fact is that in deciding as it did-that 'appointment of counsel
is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial'-the Court in Betts v. Brady made
an abrupt break with its own well considered precedents." Id. at 343-44.
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as amici curiae, arguing that Betts v. Brady, "already an anachronism
when handed down, has spawned twenty years of bad law,""' and that
Betts v. Brady should be overruled. The Court agreed, holding that
the sixth amendment's guarantee of counsel was incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment and that it was binding upon the states.
Messrs. Justice Douglas, Clark and Harlan wrote separate con-
curring opinions. Mr. Justice Harlan agreed "that Betts v. Brady
should be overruled"' 59 and that "the right to counsel in a case such
as this should not be expressly recognized as a fundamental right.' 60
He refused, however, to embrace the idea "that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 'incorporates' the Sixth Amendment as such."'' It would appear
that, were Mr. Justice Harlan's view to have prevailed, then an indi-
gent's constitutional right to counsel in state criminal trials would be
most uncertain, having vague and unclear contours. It would not be
made specific by federal precedent interpreting the sixth amendment,
and would apply only to some non-capital cases, and perhaps, not to
others. If this be true, then Mr. Justice Harlan really did not want to
overrule Betts v. Brady, but instead, he simply wished to broaden
and extend, but not destroy its "special circumstances" doctrine. Mr.
Justice Douglas attacked this position, indicating that the "rights
protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment are not watered-down versions of what the
Bill of Rights guarantees.' ' 62 In another concurring opinion, Mr.
Justice Clark approvingly pointed out that Gideon erased the distinc-
tion between capital and non-capital cases which really had "no basis
in logic and an increasingly eroded basis in authority." ''
The Gideon case poses many new problems. There can be no doubt
that Gideon imposes an absolute mandate on state courts to appoint
counsel for indigent defendants in criminal trials. However, a thresh-
hold question concerns the breadth of application of the Gideon case:
Does an indigent's right to counsel extend to all criminal cases, in-
cluding misdemeanor cases, or is it limited only to felony cases?' 64
There is precious little in the opinion of the Court bearing on this
158 Brief for the state government Amici Curiae, Gideon v. Wainwright supra, note
156.159 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963).
l Id. at 352.
161 Ibid.
162 Id. at 347. The weight of authority seems to be with Mr. Justice Douglas; see
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 530 (1957).
163 Id. at 348.
164 See Comment, The Right To Counsel In Misdemeanor Cases, 48 CAL. L. REv.
501 (1960).
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question. At the outset, it should be noted that the opinion has no
language strictly limiting the Gideon decision to felony cases. Sec-
ondly, there is language in the opinion which, if literally followed, is
broad enough to include misdemeanors." 5 Thirdly, that part of the
sixth amendment which has been incorporated flatly applies to all
cases: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. '166
Furthermore, although the Court has never decided squarely that
Johnson v. Zerbst1 67 applies to federal misdemeanor cases, there is
language, in other cases, indicating that it does 68 In addition, a court
of appeals has held that Johnson v. Zerbst applies to a misdemeanor
case.
169
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that the sixth
amendment does not guarantee any person, rich or poor, charged with
a petty offense to a right to trial by jury. °17  By analogy, then, an argu-
ment could be made that an indigent defendant need not be given
counsel and could still be afforded a fair trial. However, there is
doubt that retained counsel could be barred from such a trial,171 with-
out denying a defendant his right to a fair trial. Consequently, the
counter-argument arises that if a fair trial is denied when retained
counsel is excluded from a petty offense trial, then a fair trial is
similarly denied when an indigent defendant fails to be represented
by counsel. 2 In summary, one can only say that this point has yet
to be resolved by the Court, and that, literally, as matters incon-
clusively now stand, it appears that Gideon's requirement that counsel
be offered indigent defendants in "all criminal prosecutions," includes
misdemeanor prosecutions. 17
5
165 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) : "any person haled into court, who
is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is pro-
vided.. ." Id. at 344. "This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged
with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer.. .. " (Emphasis added).
166 U.S. CONsT. amend. 6 (Emphasis added).
167 304 U.S. 458 (1938) see text discussion at notes 116-126.
168 "By virtue of the [sixth amendment] . . . counsel must be furnished to an indi-
gent defendant prosecuted in a federal court in every case, whatever the circum-
stances!" Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 136-37 (1947) (Emphasis added) ; see also
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 666 (1948).169 Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (conviction for failure to
provide child support).
170 Dist. of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1936) ; Schick v. United States,
195 U.S. 65,(1904) ; see also Dist. of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930).
171 E.g., "Indeed the right to assistance of counsel whom the accused has himself
retained is absolute, whatever the offense for which he is on trial." Spano v. New
York, 360 U.S. 315, 327 (1959) (concurring opinion).
172 If this latter view is correct, then RCW 10.01.110 should be reconsidered because
it limits an offer of counsel to felony cases.
173 "'[N~o reason appears in logic, morals or humanity' why anyone accused of
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Another concern... raised by the Gideon case is whether it will be
given retroactive application. It should be noted that Griffin v. Illinois,
discussed above,"' involved a closely allied right, and has been applied
retrospectively. Griffin is of great importance when combined with
the unanimous decision of Walker v. Johnston7 which indicated that
the rule of Johnson v. Zerbst, a 1938 decision holding that, unless
properly waived, the sixth amendment requires that an indigent de-
fendant have counsel in all criminal prosecutions, would apply retro-
spectively to a 1936 conviction. Thus, since Gideon "incorporates"
the sixth amendment, and since it is highly analogous to Griffin, it
appears that Gideon will apply retroactively. If so, the question of
what amounts to a proper waiver by an indigent of his right to counsel
will become important. 7
By far, however, the most perplexing problem raised by Gideon
concerns the stage in the total criminal law process at which an
indigent defendant must be offered counsel. There is, however, no
perplexity concerning the time when counsel is actually needed. Pro-
fessor Zechariah Chafee has aptly stated that "A person accused of
crime needs a lawyer right after his arrest probably more than at any
other time.' 78  The question is, does an indigent have a right to
counsel immediately after his arrest?
At this juncture it is necessary to see clearly that, although the
historical gap has been closing, the constitutional right to counsel
has been divided into two parts-the right to retain counsel and an
indigent's right to have counsel appointed. Under the fourteenth
amendment, the right to retain, and to be represented by, counsel
attaches early and continues throughout the entire criminal law pro-
any crime should be denied this fundamental right." Fellman, The Constitutional
Right to Counsel in Federal Courts, 30 NEB. L. REv. 559, 594 (1951).
174 1 do not consider whether counsel may have to be appointed for indigent delin-
quents; one case would indicate the affirmative; see People v. Manfredi, 27 Misc. 2d 7,
8, 215 N.Y.S.2d 781, 783 (Schenectady County Ct. 1960).
175 See text at notes 25-43.
176 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941).
177 This topic goes beyond the bounds of this paper, but for discussion of the waiver
doctrine, see, BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS, 66-72 (1955),
and Fellman, The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Courts, 30 NEB. L. REv.
559, 572-583 (1951).
ITS CHAFEE, DOCUMENTS ON FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 541 (1951-52). And,
according to Mr. Justice Jackson: "To subject one without counsel to questioning
which may and is intended to convict him, is a real peril to individual freedom ...
If the State may arrest on suspicion and interrogate without counsel, there is no
denying the fact that it largely negates the benefits of the constitutional guaranty of
the right to assistance of counsel." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (con-
curring opinion).
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cess,1' ° including a preliminary hearing or any other proceedings pre-
liminary to trial. On the other hand, an indigent's right appears to
attach much later. There is no doubt that an offer of counsel must
be made at some time before the morning of trial. This much is clear
because an indigent accused is entitled to effective representation, and
mere appearance of a lawyer on the morning of the trial will not, in
itself, satisfy the constitutional requirement.' In Washington, the
right clearly attaches at least sometime "before being arraigned."',
However, recent interpretations of the fourteenth amendment indicate
that this standard may be inadequate as offering counsel too late in
the criminal law processes.
One of the most recent and relevant cases is Hamilton v. Alabama. 2
Hamilton, charged with a capital crime, was arraigned after indictment
without the benefit of counsel and pleaded guilty. Although he was
assigned counsel prior to trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to
death. Under Alabama procedures, the arraignment denoted the time
when a defendant had to enter certain defenses, such as insanity, or
waive them, and failure to plead these defenses was not reviewable on
appeal. Hamilton sought to attack his conviction in the Alabama
courts by way of coram nobis, but was denied relief. On certiorari, a
unanimous Supreme Court reversed. It declared that "whatever may
be the function and importance of arraignment in other jurisdictions,
• ..in Alabama it is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding."' 83
Although Hamilton was a capital case, the crux of the decision is
bound up in the concept of the "critical stages of a criminal pro-
ceeding." Since Gideon eliminates the capital versus non-capital dis-
tinction, then it is clear that Hamilton requires a state to provide
counsel at all "critical stages" in all criminal proceedings. "Only the
presence of counsel could have enabled this accused to know all the
defenses available to him and to plead intelligently."'8 4 This con-
sideration raises many questions, one of which is whether a pre-
liminary hearing is a "critical stage."
This question was presented in White v. Maryland.' White, ar-
170 But not in an administrative proceeding, see In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957)
where a statute authorizing a fire marshal to exclude counsel at an investigative pro-
ceeding was upheld by a sharply divided court on the "civil investigation-criminal
trial" distinction.
180 See, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
181 RCW 10.40.030.
182 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
1-83 Id. at 54.
184 Id. at 55.
185 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
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rested on a charge of murder, was taken before a magistrate for a
preliminary hearing where he pleaded guilty without having the
benefit of counsel. At his formal arraignment, he pleaded not guilty;
however, the plea of guilty made at the preliminary hearing was
later introduced into evidence. White was convicted and sentenced to
death; this was affirmed by Maryland's court of appeals. The Su-
preme Court, on a grant of certiorari which was "limited to the point
of law raised in Hamilton v. Alabama . . . "18 reversed. In a un-
animous per curiam opinion, the Court specifically noted that the
rationale of Hamilton "does not rest . . . on a showing of preju-
dice.... It then went on to hold that the preliminary hearing, under
Maryland's law, was "'a critical stage in a criminal proceeding' where
rights are preserved or lost. 188  Consequently, an offer of counsel
should have been made at the preliminary hearing stages.
It is interesting to note that in neither opinion-Hamilton nor
White-does a statement appear to the effect that the petitioners
were indigents. Thus, it appears that the fourteenth amendment
places a duty upon a state trial judge, whenever an accused appears
without counsel during any "critical stage" of a criminal proceeding,
to ascertain whether that accused is indigent, and if so, to make an
offer of counsel. This view is in harmony with precedential ante-
cedents. Even under the fair-trial doctrine of Betts v. Brady, it has
long been a negative implication that an indigent's right to counsel
attached before trial if "special circumstances" were presented."9
These two cases-Hamilton and White-are of great significance
for Washington's criminal procedure since it is peculiar in several
respects. For example, there is no requirement in Washington, similar
to that found in the statutes existing in the vast majority of the other
states 9 and in the rules governing federal criminal practice,' which
requires that every person who has been taken into custody by a police
officer, without a warrant, be taken without unnecessary delay, before
a magistrate for a preliminary hearing to see whether there exists
186 Ibid.
187 Id. at 60, footnote.
188 Ibid.
189 See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S.
504 (1958); Beaney, The Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 AIINN. L. REv.
771 (1961), and Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Interrogation: The Right to Counsel
and to Prompt Arraignment, 27 BROOKLYN L. REV. 24 (1960).
190 A survey of the statutes governing an accused's right to a preliminary hearing
in England, Scotland, France, Italy and the United States appears in the commentaries
to Ch. 2, Am. Law Inst., Code Crim. Proc. 266 et seq. (1931).
191 Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., 5(a).
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probable cause for charging the accused with a criminal offense.'92
The purposes of such a procedure, in states other than Washington,
are to protect an accused from illegal detention and to deter illegal
arrests.193 Washington does provide for a preliminary hearing pro-
cedure, but its use is optional, in the discretion of law enforcement
officials.'9" A complaint must be filed before a magistrate is em-
powered to hold a preliminary hearing,... and this statute has been
construed only as a regulation of the complaints brought by private
persons and is not a condition that police or prosecutors must meet.'
However, prosecutors can, and do, use this device, particularly when
they wish to test, under oath, some shaky evidence before relying
upon it for purposes of filing an information. 97 Thus, one cannot say
102 Although aimed in the right direction, the recently adopted criminal rules for
courts of limited jurisdiction, see Rules 1.01 et seq. in RCW, Vol. "0," do not meet
this problem. Rule 2.03 (b) provides that when a person is arrested without a warrant,
he must be taken to jail; and "if the offense with which he is charged is subject to
bail," and "if his physical condition warrants," and if it is "practicable" (presumably
in the discretion of the police), then, "the person arrested ... shall be permitted to
deposit bail." It should be noted that there is no requirement that the person arrested
actually be charged with a crime, but rather, the rule assnmes that a charge will be
made. Rule 2.03(c) (3) does not remedy the situation, for it, too, assumes a charge
and an appearance before a judge. It provides that if "the offense charged is not
bailable," then, the arrested person must be taken before "the nearest judge" "without
unnecessary delay." Thus, the rules simply require that an arrested person be taken
to jail where further proceedings can take place. Furthermore, there is no sanction
in the rules, or elsewhere, for failure to take an arrested person to jail, or in the
appropriate case, before the nearest judge "without unnecessary delay." Thus, the
needed stimulus to assure compliance with the rules appears lacking.
193 "A person is arrested. It may very well be that even the most superficial look
at the facts would at once show that he could not possibly be guilty of the offense
charged. It is nothing more than obvious fairness to him, then, that he should be
discharged at the soonest possible moment. Accordingly, promptly after an arrest the
arrested person is entitled to be brought before a judge-in this phase of the work
we usually refer to him as a 'magistrate'-so that the latter may decide whether, if
the state's evidence is true, it presents a strong enough case to warrant holding our
man for further proceedings, or whether the showing is so weak that there is no
chance of a conviction. If the former is the case then it is the magistrate's duty to
set the bail. If the latter, then the accused is entitled to his immediate liberty and the
case ends then and there. From this it will be plain that the preliminary examination
is a stage in the entire proceedings which is almost wholly to the advantage of the
accused. . . :" Puttkamer, Criminal Law Enforcement 6 (U. of Chi. L. Sch. Papers,
1941) quoted in PAULsEN & KADIsH, CpamiNAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 918 (1962).
294 Pennington v. Smith, 35 Wn2d 267, 212 P.2d 811 (1949) "Where, however, the
prosecutor elects to proceed independently, he . . . may file an information on his own
authority."
395 RCW 10.16.010. There is no requirement that an arresting officer or prosecuting
attorney must file such a complaint without unnecessary delay upon the arrest of a
person without a warrant.
19 6 Pennington v. Smith, 35 Wn2d 267, 212 P2d 811 (1949): "A preliminary
hearing is not necessary to due process."
197 It would seem that Washington's procedure, which seriously upsets the relatively
equal balance of contending forces, and which favors the state, may well place undue
discretion in the prosecutor, and place throttling controls on the proper functioning
of the adversary system. See Dession, From Indictmen;t to Information--I,nplications
of the Shift, 42 YALE LJ. 163 (1932), and Goldstein, The State and the Accised:
Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 65 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960).
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that the guiding purpose of Washington's preliminary hearing pro-
cedure is to protect an accused or to deter illegal arrests.'
Washington's preliminary hearing is similar in many respects to an
actual trial. A prosecuting attorney will introduce evidence to support
the charges to which an accused can enter a plea, or testify on his
own behalf. The testimony is frequently, if not always, reduced to
writing and signed. 9 In the event of a subsequent criminal trial on
the charges, not only may the magistrate... who presided at the pre-
liminary hearing, or the stenographer' 0 ' who transcribed the testimony,
testify against the accused, but the plea of the accused (if one was
made) and, in most instances, the transcript which was made at the
preliminary hearing are admissible into evidence.0 2 Thus, it would
appear, under Hamilton and White, that whenever a preliminary
hearing is held, it qualifies as a "critical stage in a criminal proceeding
where rights are preserved or lost." If so, counsel must be offered
to an indigent accused whenever he appears at a preliminary hearing. 203
This conclusion is supported by another recent case, Haynes v.
Washington,' which has critically important implications for Wash-
ington's criminal law processes. The reason is that this case appears
to exclude confessions taken from an accused during a period when
he has unreasonably been held incommunicado;0 5 thus, it may fore-
shadow the imposition upon the states of a rule similar to McNabb-
Mallory, °0 which operates in the federal courts.
198 The awesome extent of illegal arrests is little known. However, the FBI Uni-
form Crime Reports show that an arrest on suspicion is common police practice in
this country. Obviously, since there is no such crime, these arrests are all illegal.
Those arrested in 1956 on "suspicion" and then released without there being any
prosecution whatsoever, ran at the rate of 280.4 people per 100,000 inhabitants. (FBI,
Uniform Crime Reports No. 1, Semiann. Bull. 65 (1957)). The figure for arrests on
suspicion in 1958 was 96,740. (1958, id., at 93), and in 1962, the figure climbed to
121,218. (1962, id., at 93, table 19). See generally Fraenkel, From Suspicion to
Accusation, 51 YALE L.J. 748 (1942), and Hall, Arrest in Relation to Contemporary
Social Problems, 3 U. CMi. REv. 345 (1936).
199 RCW 10.16.060 and RCW 10.16.160.
200 Under the intelligent bystander doctrine, see State v. Bixby, 27 Wn.2d 144, 166,
173, 177 P.2d 689, 701, 705 (1947).
201 See State v. Fetterly, 33 Wash. 599, 74 Pac. 810 (1903).
202 See RCW 10.16.060 and RCW 10.16.160 and State v. Ball, 150 Wash. 131, 272
Pac. 53 (1928) ; State v. Morris, 109 Wash. 490, 187 Pac. 350 (1920) ; State v.
Harding, 108 Wash. 606, 185 Pac. 579 (1919) ; Annot., 141 A.L.R. 1335.
203 The Washington supreme court is moving in this direction; see Pettit v. Rhay,
162 Wash. Dec. 506, 383 P.2d 889 (1963). This case appears circumscribed by the
"special circumstances" doctrine of Betts v. Brady, but its portent is obvious.
204373 U.S. 503 (1963).
20 Also important are Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (conviction of a
14-year-old boy on the basis of a confession obtained while he was held incommunicado
for five days was reversed), and Lynum v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (conviction
of a woman on the basis of a confession obtained by police threats to deprive her of
her children was reversed).
206 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States,
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Haynes was convicted on a charge of robbery and sentenced to
prison. His conviction was affirmed by the Washington supreme
court. During the trial, and over Haynes' timely objection, a written
confession was admitted in evidence. It had been obtained after
Haynes had been held incommunicado for sixteen hours, having
"several times asked police to allow him to call an attorney and to
call his wife."2- 7 No claim was made that Haynes "was physically
abused, deprived of food or rest, or subjected to uninterrupted ques-
tioning for prolonged periods." 08 The incommunicado detention was
in express contravention of a Washington statute,0 9 and "though the
police were in possession of evidence more than adequate to justify
his being charged without delay, it is uncontroverted that Haynes was
not taken before a magistrate and granted a preliminary hearing until
he had acceded to demands that he give and sign the written state-
ment.221 0 Thus, "the only fair inference to be drawn under all the
circumstances is that he would not be booked on the robbery charge
until the police had secured [the confession]."'21
On certiorari, by vote of five to four, the Supreme Court reversed.
Mr. Justice Goldberg delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that
the sixteen-hour incommunicado detention of Haynes plus promises
by the police to allow him to call his wife if he would give a written
confession, created an "unfair and inherently coercive context in
which .. .that choice cannot be said to be the voluntary product
of a free and unconstrained will, as required by the Fourteenth
Amendment."" The bounds of due process had been exceeded. 18
354 U.S. 449 (1957). See Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule, 47 GEo. L.J. 1
(1958). Two analysts predict that such an extension will occur in the near future:
Ritz, Twenty-five Years of State Criminal Confessions in the United States Supreme
Court, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 202 (1962), and Broeder, Wong Sun v. United
States-A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483 (1963).
207 Supra, note 204 at 504.
208 Ibid, note 1.
200 RCW 9.33.020(5).
21.o Supra note 204 at 510. The police had Haynes' "prior oral admissions, the cir-
cumstances surrounding his arrest, and his identification by witnesses .... " Id. at 512.
211 Id. at 512.
212 Id. at 514.
213 "This case illustrates a particular facet of police utilization of improper methods.
While history amply shows that confessions have often been extorted to save law
enforcement officials the trouble and effort of obtaining valid and independent evi-
dence, the coercive devices used here were designed to obtain admissions which would
incontrovertibly complete a case in which there had already been obtained, by proper
investigative efforts, competent evidence to sustain a conviction.... Official over-
zealousness of the type which vitiates the petitioner's conviction below has only
deleterious effects. Here it has put the State to the substantial additional expense of
prosecuting the case through appellate courts and, now, will require even a greater
expenditure in the event of retrial, as is likely. But it is the deprivation of the
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In a dissenting opinion, joined by three other Justices, 1' Mr. Justice
Clark thought the confession had been voluntarily given. For him,
the Court's reversal was a "departure" from prior cases and an "en-
largement" of the requirement previously demanded of state courts
in confession cases. He would look only to Haynes' "age, intelligence
and experience with the police, 2 5 and not to the period of incommu-
nicado detention. In short, he would not consider imposing McNabb-
Mallory on the states."'
It is obvious that Haynes disallows the use of confessions given by
any person who has been held incommunicado by law enforcement
officials for an unreasonable period of time, in that case sixteen hours,
and during which time the officials have in their possession sufficient
evidence to show probable cause at a preliminary hearing. Suppose,
under similar circumstances, an indigent accused makes a request for
counsel before giving any statements; if counsel were not provided,
would Haynes make inadmissible any subsequently obtained con-
fession?
The obvious way to avoid the Haynes rule is for the legislature or
Washington's supreme court to require that, after an arrest, an ac-
cused must be taken before a magistrate without unnecessary delay,
and to exclude from evidence all statements given by an accused
during the time law enforcement officials are not in compliance. Rule
5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure appears appropriate.
Rule 5(a) provides that an arrested person must be taken before a
magistrate without unnecessary delay, and Rule 5(b) requires that
the magistrate inform the accused, inter alia, of his right to retain
counsel. In addition, if the preliminary hearing is one that is a
"critical stage of a criminal proceeding," and if the accused is indi-
gent, then it would appear appropriate for the legislature, or the
supreme court," 7 to require that the magistrate make an offer of
counsel. Otherwise, confessions obtained during periods of incom-
protected rights themselves which is fundamental and the most regrettable... because
of the effect on our system of law and justice.... Official misconduct cannot but breed
disrespect for law, as well as for those charged with its enforcement." Id. at 519.
214 Messrs. Justice Harlan, Stewart and White.
215 Supra note 204 at 525.
218 If McNabb-Mallory is applied to the states then, clearly, State v. Keating, 378
P.2d 703 (Wash. 1963) must give way. In light of Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963) and Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) it would appear that
State v. Keating came to a constitutionally incorrect result.
217 A step in this direction would be for the Washington court to place the ex-
clusionary rule behind RCW 9.33.020(5) as a sanction for its violation, thereby
excluding from evidence statements made while the law enforcement authorities are
in breach of law.
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municado detention will run the risk of being excluded from evidence,
which, under Haynes, it is the constitutional duty upon the courts
to exclude.
One final case, Douglas v. California,21 decided on March 18, 1963,
governs an indigent's right to counsel on appeal. Douglas and another
were jointly tried; convicted of thirteen felonies, and sentenced to
imprisonment. Both appealed as of right to California's district court
of appeal, and being indigent, they moved that counsel be supplied
to assist them on appeal. Following a local rule, that court made an
ex parte examination of the record, and denied the motion, concluding
that the appeal was frivolous and that appointment of counsel would
not be "of advantage to the defendant or helpful to the appellate
court." Then, the direct appeal was heard without assistance of coun-
sel; the convictions were affirmed, and California's supreme court
denied a petition for further discretionary review. Thus, the issue,
clearly presented, was whether, under the fourteenth amendment, a
state may deny an indigent the assistance of counsel on direct appeal
where state law grants the appeal to rich or poor as a matter of right.
On certiorari, by vote of six to three, the United States Supreme
Court reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the
Court, holding "that the denial of counsel on appeal to an indigent
would seem to be at least as invidious as that condemned in Griffin v.
Illinois . . . a State may not grant appellate review in such a way as
to discriminate against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty." '219 It appears that the unconstitutional discrimination lay
in California's pre-appeal procedure. It required that an indigent's
appeal demonstrate "a preliminary showing of merit,.22° thus forcing
the appellate court, without benefit of counsel, "to prejudge the merits
before it can even determine whether counsel should be provided."22" '
On the other hand, whenever a non-indigent appealed, "the appellate
court passes on the merits of his case only after having the full benefit
of written briefs and oral argument by counsel." '222
218 372 U.S. 353 (1963). For a Washington case, requiring counsel at the hearing
for a transcript for an appeal see Hendrix v. Rhay 56 Wn2d 420, 353 P.2d 878
(1960).
219 Id. at 355.220 Id. at 357.
22 1 Id. at 356. It appears that counsel may be allowed to "prejudge' an appeal. "If
counsel is convinced, after conscientious investigation, that the appeal is frivolous, of
course, he may ask to withdraw on that account. If the court is satisfied that counsel
has diligently investigated the possible grounds of appeal, and agrees with counsel's
evaluation of the case, then leave to withdraw may be allowed and leave to appeal may
be denied." Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958).222 Thus, there "is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment
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One point is of special interest. It should be noted that Douglas
holds that an indigent's right to counsel is part of the Griffin principle
elaborating the equal protection clause, and does not rest the right to
counsel on appeal upon the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. This position is not surprising because, as Mr. Justice
Schaeffer, of the Illinois supreme court, had earlier indicated, the
rationale of Griffin v. Illinois was directly applicable to right-to-
counsel cases. 28 Thus, Douglas came as no surprise, and, in terms of
reality, it appears warranted because, obviously, counsel on appeal
makes important differences.2
Mr. Justice Clark's dissenting opinion in Douglas indicates that he
adhered to the Griffin principle, but thought that the effectiveness of
California's review procedures satisfied its standards. For him, an
independent examination of the record by a judge, a person obviously
within a state's judicial machinery, and his conclusion that an appeal
was frivolous were sufficient to satisfy the demands of Griffin. This
consideration, therefore, also explains Mr. Justice Clark's vote in
Lane v. Brown. where he denied constitutional validity to Indiana's
procedure allowing a non-judicial officer, a public prosecutor, outside
the judicial machinery, to preclude appellate review. It also accounts
for his dissenting vote in Draper v. Washington..6 where he would
have allowed a judge to determine that an appeal was frivolous.
Consequently, seven justices concluded that the Douglas case appro-
priately raised issues under the equal protection clause. Mr. Justice
where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examina-
tion into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf,
while the indigent, already burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is
without merit, is forced to shift for himself. The indigent, where the record is unclear
or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich
man has a meaningful appeal." Id. at 357-58.
223 "The analogy to the right to counsel case is close indeed: if a state allows one
who can afford to retain a lawyer to be represented by counsel, and so obtain a
different kind of trial, it must furnish the same opportunity to those who are unable
to hire a lawyer. Since indigence is constitutionally an irrelevance, it would seem
that a successful argument might be based upon the proposition that the defendant
by reason of his poverty is deprived of a right available to those who can afford to
exercise it." Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HAav. L. REv. 1,
10 (1956).
224 E.g., San Quentin's warden Duffy publicly has stated that "the punishment for
murder depends more upon the resources of the killer than his crime." Duffy, 88 MEN
AND 2 WomEN 256 (1962). This view cannot be squared with the ideal of "equal
justice under the law." In addition, another study shows "that court-appointed counsel
in death-sentence cases are somewhat less successful (or less zealous) in pleading
their clients' causes . . . [after trial] ... than are privately-employed counsel." Ohio
Legis. Serv. Comm., Capital Punishment, Report No. 46 p. 64 (1961). A Fortiori
unrepresented indigents must, perforce, fare worse than those with court-appointed
counsel.
225 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
226 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
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Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, in a second dissent,22 was of
the opinion that the due process clause's requirement of "fair pro-
cedure" governed Douglas, and that, under the fair procedure test,
California's procedure was adequate. It appears that this view is
simply an attempt to extend the now defunct fair-trial doctrine of
Betts v. Brady, with all its problems,2 8 to the appellate level. But, it
should be recalled that Mr. Justice Harlan probably did not want to
overrule that doctrine in the Gideon decision.
It should be noted that the Court's opinion in Douglas explicitly
pointed out that the Court was "dealing only with the first appeal,
granted as a matter of rights to rich and poor alike. .... ,,22o Thus,
Douglas is confined in its immediate application to those states,
similar to Washington, where an appeal is granted as a matter of
right. Nevertheless, Douglas necessarily embodies the notion that
the denial of counsel to an indigent is embraced within the dynamic
Griffin principle. Since the Griffin principle already has been held
applicable to discretionary appeals,220 it appears that Douglas may
foreshadow an extension of an indigent's right to counsel to discretion-
ary appeals, and perhaps to collateral appeal proceedings as well.23'
In addition, the Griffin principle has been held applicable to state
habeas corpus proceedings, 232 which is, of course, a collateral attack, 33
non-appellate proceeding, and there appears no reason to believe that,
therefore, the Griffin principle is less applicable to other non-appellate
proceedings, such as preliminary hearings, thereby necessitating an
offer of counsel to an indigent accused, even though the preliminary
hearing is not viewed as constituting a "critical stage" of a criminal
proceeding.234
Realizing these implications which are inherent in the Griffin prin-
ciple, the Oklahoma supreme court has held that counsel must be
appointed for all indigents when they are brought before a magistrate
on arrest.235 It appears that Washington's supreme court is cautiously,
227 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 360 (1963).
228 See text discussion at notes 148-155.
220 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963). (Emphasis in original).
230 Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
231 See Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
232 Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1963).
233 See, Comment, The Right To Counsel In Federal Collateral Attack Proceedings,
30 U. CEL L. REv. 583 (1963).
234 For additional discussion see Note, Basic Rights of An Individual From Arrest
Until Trial In New England, 42 BosToiq U. L. Rxv. 72 (1962); Note, Right To
Comsel During Police Investigation, 26 RuTGERs L. REv. 573 (1962), and Hamley,
The Impact of Griffln v. Illinois On State-Federal Court Relationships, 24 F.R.D. 75
(1959).
235 Wyatt v. Wolf, 324 P2d 548 (Okla. Crim. App. (1958)).
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and wisely, taking the same route." 6 Although this position may imply
something akin to a public defender system, this position appears to
be the proper one for these reasons. First, this seems to be one reason-
able way of handling the need for counsel" under Gideon and
Douglas. But, second, if the dynamic Griffin principle, requiring
counsel, expands beyond Gideon and Douglas, as it appears probable,
and since the Griffin principle applies retroactively, then Oklahoma,
already having provided counsel at all stages in the criminal law
process, will be confronted neither with severe dislocations of its
criminal law processes, nor with onerous burdens upon its courts, or
a mass release of people from its prisons." 8 Oklahoma will have safe-
guarded itself from these eventualities by affording an accused his
full measure of constitutional rights. That these eventualities are
real is underscored by the final matter considered.3
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS AND STATE PRISONERS
The United State Constitution expressly protects the writ of habeas
corpus24 ° which, aptly, has been called the most important human
right in the Constitution.24' This writ has played a central role in our
legal history, mediating the clashes of order with liberty.42 The
function of the writ of habeas corpus is, simply, to test "the legality
236 Pettit v. Rhay, 162 Wash. Dec. 506, 383 P.2d 889 (1963).
237 The old "assigned counsel" system is clearly unable to meet the needs. See
Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in Federal Courts, 76
HARv. L. REV. 579 (1963). A public defender system has been recommended for
Washington. Washington State Legislature, Joint Committee On Governmental Co-
operation, Report 14-26 (1963). Compare, Dimock, The Public Defender: A Step
Towards a Police State? 42 A.B.A.J. 219 (1956) with Harrington & Getty, The
Public Defender: A Progressive Step Towards Justice, 42 A.B.A.J. 1139 (1956). An
evaluation of the various systems of aid lies beyond the scope of this paper; however,
one thorough report should be brought to attention: EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE Ac-
CUSED, REPORT, SPECIAL COmMITTEE, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK AND NATIONAL LEGAL AID ASSOCIATION, 26-28 (1959), and see the review of
this book by Professor A. Goldstein in 28 U. C. LAW Rv. 772-73 (1961), and
The Right to Counsel: A Symposium, 45 MINN. L. REv. 693 (1961).
238 Indeed, on October 14, 1963, the Supreme Court vacated a judgment, remanding
the case "to the Supreme Court of Florida for further consideration in light of Gideon
v. Wainwright .. " It appears that the "question is whether the denial of an indi-
gent defendant's right to counsel in the state criminal trial as established in Gideon v.
Wainwright . . . invalidates his pre-Gideon conviction." Pickelsimer v. Wainwright,
32 U.S. Law Week 3136, No. 14 (Oct. 15, 1963).
239 1 will set forth only a brief sketch of the two recent cases because a full analysis
would call for a separate article.
240 "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it." United
States Const. Art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
241 Chafee, The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U.L. REV.
143 (1952), and see I HOLDSwORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 227-8 (1927).
242 E.g., Bollman v. Swartout, 8 U.S. 75 (1807) (alleged sedition of Aaron Burr's
co-conspirators) ; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (questioned presidential power
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of the detention of one in custody of another."24 State courts are
bound under the Constitution to apply "the Supreme Law of the
Land."24 Thus, within a constitutional context, the function of the
writ is to test those detentions which are in violation of the supreme
law of the land, abridging a person's constitutional rights. Vindication
of due process of law is the historical office of the writ. 45
It is well known that the non-constitutional principle of res adjudi-
cata must give away, and is inapplicable, to bar the bringing of a
habeas corpus proceeding. Constitutional rights cannot be defeated in
every instance by mechanical, administrative court rules designed to
punish a person for his state procedural defaults. This is simply
another way of saying that judgments which embody a violation of
a defendant's constitutional rights are void, and void judgments may
be collaterally attacked, and impeached. Habeas corpus litigation
can involve all constitutional rights, including attacks in federal dis-
trict courts, by state prisoners on their detention when it has been
based on a judgment rendered in a state case where, for example, an
indigent accused has been denied his constitutional right to counsel,
or his constitutional right to a transcript of sufficient completeness
for appellate review purposes, or his constitutional right not to have
a coerced confession introduced into evidence against him." 6
Congress has made explicit the power of federal courts to issue the
writ whenever a person is being detained by state officials in violation
of the Constitution.24 By another statute,"" Congress has prescribed
the appropriate methods of exercising this power in relation to state
prisoners, but, it should be noted, this measure does not circumscribe
the power to issue the writ. 49 Even so, federal habeas corpus juris-
to require trials by military courts during civil war) ; Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283
(1944) (challenge of power to hold citizen of Japanese descent in relocation centers
during World War II), and see, Cxuncir, HABEAs CoRaus, § 40, note 6 (1884).
243 McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136 (1934), and see Bushell's Case, 6 Howelrs
State Trials 999 (1670).
244 United States Const., Art. VI.
245 See In re Allen v. Rhay, 52 Wn.2d 609, 328 P.2d 367, cert. den. 358 U.S. 900
(1958), and RCW 7.36.130(1), et seq.
240 This last point is especially significant in light of the holding in Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963), and note, Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954),
and Cranor v. Gonzales, 226 F,2d 83 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. den., 350 U.S. 935 (1956),
affirming, Giron v. Cranor, 116 F.Supp. 92 (E.D. Wash. 1953).
247 "Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice
thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdic-
tions . . . "The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . "He
is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1958).
248 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
240 If there is no available state procedure, at the time of filing for the writ, by
which a defendant, imprisoned under state authority, can raise a federal question in
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diction has been a tangled and dimly lit network of precedents."'
The United States Supreme Court decided two cases on March 18,
1963, which should prove helpful in clarifying the darkened corners
of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.
The facts of Fay v. Noia"1 are uncomplicated. In 1942, Noia and
two co-defendants were convicted of felony-murder in a New York
state court, and each was sentenced to life imprisonment. The sole
evidence against each defendant was his confession. The two co-
defendants, but not Noia, appealed their convictions which were
affirmed by the appellate division of the New York supreme court.
However, subsequent legal proceedings unequivocally showed that
their confessions had been coerced,252 and they were released. After
this decision, Noia, claiming that his constitutional rights had been
violated, applied to the New York courts for a coram nobis review of
his conviction, but his application was denied, ultimately, on the
ground of his procedural failure to have taken a direct appeal. Making
the same claim, Noia then petitioned a United States district court
for a writ of habeas corpus. Although it was conceded at the hearing
that Noia's confession had been coerced, the petition was denied on
the ground that Noia's failure to have taken a direct appeal consti-
tuted a failure to exhaust his available state remedies under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. The court of appeals reversed, and certiorari was granted
by the United States Supreme Court which, by a vote of six to three,
affirmed the court of appeals,25 but on other grounds.
the state courts, then, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 will permit an immediate petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in a federal district court: "An application for a writ of habeas
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available
State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process
ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner. An applicant shall not be deemed to
have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning
of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available
procedure, the question presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963), and see, Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconvictiou Remedy for State
Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. Rav. 461 (1960).
250 E.g., Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding,
74 HARv. L. REv. 1315 (1961) ; Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus And State Prisoners,
7 UTAH L. REV. 423 (1961), and Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction
Reviedy for State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 461 (1960).
251372 U.S. 391 (1963).
252 "Why the upper New York courts did not reverse the conviction we do not
know, as they filed no opinions. All decent Americans soundly condemn satanic
practices, like those described above, when employed in totalitarian regimes. It should
shock us when American police resort to them, because they do not comport with
the barest minimum of civilized principles of justice . . ." United States v. Murphy,
222 F.2d 698 (1955) cert. den. 350 U.S. 896.
253 Mr. Justice Clark dissented indicating that "Noia's incarceration rests entirely
on an adequate and independent state ground-namely, that he knowingly failed to
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The opinion of the court which was delivered by Mr. Justice Bren-
nan includes a lengthy and scholarly historical analysis of the writ
of habeas corpus. There appear to be three basic holdings: 25. (1) Sec-
tion 2254's requirement that a petitioner exhaust "the remedies
available in the courts of a state" before seeking habeas corpus in
the federal courts was construed to mean that this requirement did
not refer to those state remedies once open but no longer available
at'the time of filing, but rather, it "refers only to a failure to exhaust
state remedies still open to the applicant at the time he files his
application for habeas corpus;" (2) Under the applicable statutes,
therefore, federal courts have power to grant habeas corpus relief
even though a petitioner has failed to pursue a state remedy, if that
state remedy is no longer open and available to him at the time he
petitions for habeas corpus. This means that the rule directing that
state procedural defaults constitute an adequate and independent
ground for state decision, barring direct Supreme Court review, is
not, by analogy, to be extended to the federal courts, limiting their
power under the federal habeas corpus statute. It is, simply, a prac-
tice confined to the United States Supreme Court, and (3) Noia's
failure to appeal did not constitute an attempt deliberately to by-pass
orderly state procedures. If it had, then, his deliberate failure to
perfect a state appeal would have resulted in a conscious forfeiture
of Noia's state court remedies, and would have amounted to a waiver,
precluding relief by way of federal habeas corpus. This holding rests
on the view that a federal court sitting in habeas corpus is not bound
by a state court's finding of waiver to raise constitutional issues, since
waiver of a constitutional right is a federal question. In short, Noia
had not consciously waived, or deliberately by-passed his state court
remedies.
Although the Court held that the jurisdiction of a federal court on
habeas corpus is not affected by procedural defaults incurred during
state court proceedings, it should be pointed out that the effective
perfect any appeal from his conviction of murder." Id. at 445. Mr. Justice Harlan,joined by Messrs. Justice Clark and Stewart, dissented on the ground that the con-
trolling question in the case was "the adequacy, or fairness of the state ground" and
that Noia's case involved an adequate state ground which was his failure to appeal.
Implicit in his position is the view that the test, whether a petitioner has exhausted
his state remedies under section 2254, is to be made as of the time those remedies are
made available under state law, and not at the time he files a petition for habeas
corpus; thus, state procedural failures would bar relief by way of federal habeas
corpus.254 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1963). This fifty-four page opinion is too
complex to be fully analyzed at this juncture.
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operation of this case will not be to substitute federal habeas corpus
proceedings for the necessity of a convicted defendant's properly
taking a state appeal, or properly seeking to exhaust other state
remedies. Nothing in Noia indicates that federal judges need be
blind to the exigencies of federalism. The case operates only in the
context where state courts have refused to consider, or actually have
passed on, a state prisoner's claim to a federal constitutional right.
Thus, the integrity of the states has been preserved, and the require-
ments of federalism have been met.
Fay v. Noia clearly indicates that federal court jurisdiction on
habeas corpus is not necessarily affected by state procedural defaults,
but the Court did recognize a "limited discretion in the federal judge
to deny relief to an applicant under certain circumstances.2 .5  A
federal "judge may in his discretion deny relief to an applicant who
has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts
and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies.... When
making this decision, it is necessary, the Court indicated, for a federal
judge to apply the classic waiver doctrine, enunciated in Johnson v.
Zerbst, discussed above; "an intentional relinquishment of a known
right or privilege. 2 7 When this doctrine was applied to Noia,"8 the
255 Id. at 438. However, "where state procedural snarls or obstacles preclude an
effective state remedy against unconstitutional convictions, federal courts have no
other choice but to grant relief in the collateral proceeding." Bartone v. United States,
32 U.S. Law Week 3162, No. 16 (Oct. 29, 1963).
226 Ibid, and see State v. Angevine, 385 P.2d 329 (Wash. 1963).
257 "If a habeas applicant, after consultation with competent counsel or otherwise,
understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his
federal claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons
that can fairly be described as the deliberate bypassing of state procedures, then it is
open to the federal court on habeas to deny him all relief if the state courts refused
to entertain his federal claim on the merits-though of course only after the federal
court has satisfied itself, by holding a hearing or by some other means, of the facts
bearing upon the applicant's default." Id. at 439.
258 "For Noia to have appealed in 1942 would have been to run a substantial risk
of electrocution. His was the grisly choice whether to sit content with life imprison-
ment or to travel the uncertain avenue of appeal, which, if successful, might well
have led to retrial and death sentence. . . .He declined to play Russian roulette in
this fashion.... This is not to say that in every case where a heavier penalty, even
the death penalty, is a risk incurred by taking an appeal or otherwise foregoing a
procedural right, waiver as we have defined it cannot be found. Each case must
stand on its facts." (Id. at 439-40). It appears that the facts of Noia's case involved
a trial judge who, not being bound to accept the jury's recommendation of a life
sentence, had said when sentencing Noia: "I have thought seriously about rejecting
the recommendation of the jury in your case, Noia, because I feel that if the jury
knew who you were and what you were and your background as a robber, they
would not have made a recommendation. But you have got a good lawyer, that is
my wife. The last thing she told me this morning was to give you a chance." Id.,
note 3 at 397. It would appear that if Noia, who was represented by counsel, were
not faced with such a "grisly choice," i.e., the possibility of electrocution, then, on the
facts presented, a waiver would have been found. This view is supported by Norvell
v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420 (1963), and would be the more usual case.
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Court could not justify the inference that Noia deliberately had by-
passed New York's court system.259 Thus, conscious waiver or delib-
erate by-passing appears to be the exclusive means whereby a state
prisoner can forfeit his right to have a federal court pass on his
federal claim, and the question whether a waiver has, in fact, taken
place is a federal question 6
Fay v. Noia dealt with the power of a United States district court
to grant habeas corpus in cases presenting procedural imperfections
in state proceedings, but where a state court had already passed on
a prisoner's claim to a federal constitutional right. Additionally,
however, the Court did discuss the breadth of a federal district court's
power of independent adjudication, indicating that, even where a state
court adjudication had turned wholly on primary, historical facts, a
district court has the broad power on habeas corpus, to order another
evidentiary hearing, relitigating the federal question, to determine the
facts. This power gives rise to several necessary questions. Is the
exercise of the power to order a de novo hearing discretionary with
a district court judge, or must he, in some circumstances, hold a
plenary hearing? If a plenary hearing is required, what should be
the nature and extent of that hearing, and what weight should a federal
district court afford prior state court proceedings wherein a state court
has already passed on a prisoner's federal claim? These questions
were the subject of another opinion handed down on March 18, 1963;
Townsend v. Saim..8
In a jury trial in an Illinois state court, Townsend, a narcotic addict,
was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. After exhausting
state remedies, he petitioned a federal district court for a writ of
habeas corpus, claiming that he had been coerced into giving a con-
fession, obtained while he was under the influence of drugs, including
a "truth serum" which, unknown to Townsend, had been administered
by a police physician under the guise of giving him narcotics to al-
leviate narcotic withdrawal symptoms. Townsend's confession had
been admitted into evidence over his objection that it had been co-
259 It is important to note that this holding does not indicate that a state prisoner
can be released on habeas corpus if he has been properly imprisoned on some other,
non-defective criminal charge. Thus, the autonomy of state law within the proper
sphere of its substantive regulation is fully preserved. If "a prisoner is detained
lawfully under one count of the indictment, he cannot challenge the lawfulness of a
second count on federal habeas corpus." Id. at 432.
200 But, "A choice made by counsel not participated in by the petitioner does not
automatically bar relief." Id. at 439.
201372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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erced. There was conflicting evidence on the coercion point during
trial, but the trial judge "made no findings of fact and wrote no
opinion stating the grounds of his decision.
262
In the federal district court hearing on the petition for habeas
corpus, it was conceded that a dispute existed about the nature of
the drugs administered to Townsend, their effects, and whether facts
bearing on a resolution of these questions had been concealed during
the state court hearing on the admissibility of the confesion. Townsend
argued that, on the record of his case, he was entitled to a plenary
hearing wherein he might produce evidence supporting his allegations
on the coercion point and that the district court was not bound solely
to the undisputed state-court records in making its determination
whether Townsend's confession had been freely and voluntarily given.
Nevertheless, the district court held no hearing, finding that "Justice
would not be served by ordering a full hearing . ,,"63 It dismissed
the petition on the ground that the court was satisfied from the state
court records that the decisions of the state courts were correct and
that there had been no denial of due process of law. The court of
appeals affirmed, and Townsend petitioned for certiorari.
The Supreme Court, by vote of five to four, reversed, holding that
"on this record the federal district judge was obliged to hold a hear-
ing."'264 The opinion of the court was delivered by Mr. Chief Justice
Warren. It goes well beyond the narrow holding, stating, "we think
that it is appropriate at this time to elaborate the considerations which
ought properly to govern the grant or denial of evidentiary hearings
in federal habeas corpus proceedings." '65
In its holding and elaboration Townsend settles that, in certain
cases, a district court judge in a habeas corpus proceeding has no
discretion and must grant such a hearing:
Where the facts are in dispute, the Federal court on habeas corpus
must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did not re-
ceive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court, either at the
time of trial or in a collateral proceeding. In other words, a Federal
evidentiary hearing is required unless the state-court trier of fact has
after a full hearing reliably found the relevant facts.266
262 Id. at 302-3.
263 Id. at 297.
264Id. at 322.
265Id. at 310.
266 Id. at 312-13. "We hold that a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing
to a habeas applicant under the following circumstances: If (1) the merits of the
factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determina-
tion is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact finding procedure
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Townsend also demonstrates that if the record made' in a state
court is to qualify as a "full and fair evidentiary hearing," then it
clearly must show that the state trier of facts applied the appropriate
constitutional standard. For example, when the question is whether
a confession has been coerced, it would be appropriate for a state trial
judge to set forth the constitutional standard actually used to measure
the relevant facts.267 Otherwise, it appears, that a petitioner on federal
habeas corpus automatically will be entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
As the Court indicated when it reversed Townsend: "In short, there
are no indicia which would indicate whether the trial judge applied
the proper standard of Federal law in ruling upon the admissibility
of the confession.'.2 8 A state trial judge should set forth the applicable
constitutional standard in his findings of fact and conclusions of law.
In a dissenting opinion in Townsend, Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by
Messrs. Justice Clark, Harlan and White, agreed fully with the Court
that a confession induced by drugs was constitutionally inadmissible;
that, in a habeas corpus proceeding, a district court's inquiry is not
limited to a study of the undisputed portions of the state-court's
records, and a district court has power to receive evidence and try
facts anew to determine the truth of allegations which, if true, Would
justify relief. The dissenters differed with the Court only about the
wisdom of using the Townsend, or any other, case as a, vehicle for
cataloging a set of standards governing habeas corpus proceedings
and, secondly, about the appropriate application of the standards set
forth in Townsend, believing that a de novo evidentiary hearing was
not required on the Townsend facts.269
When Townsend is considered in conjunction with Fay v. Noia, it
appears clear that a state prisoner, who alleges that a denial of a
federal constitutional right occurred during a state criminal proceed-
employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material
facts were not adequately developed at the state court hearing; or (6) for. any reason
it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and
fair fact hearing." Id. at 313. These imperatives are of critical importance to state
judges as well. For if state judges will undertake the responsibility of seeing to it
that the record of the state proceedings clearly shows that each of these imperaties
has been fully met, then, obviously, a federal district court judge will not be likely to
upset those state proceedings.
267 That standard is discussed in Townsend. Id. at 307-10. Also see, I-aynes:,v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) ; Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963), and see
Rules of Pleading Practice And Procedure, RCW, § 101.20W, Vol. "0,' as amended,
effective Jan. 2, 1961.
26 8 Id. at 320.2 69 Id. at 325.
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ing,7 ° will be able to obtain federal district court review of the manner
in which the state courts have handled his federal constitutional claim,
unless he has consciously waived that right or has deliberately tried
to by-pass orderly state procedures. Where the facts are in dispute, if
a state should fail to hold a hearing that complies with the standard of
a "full and fair evidentiary hearing," elaborated in Townsend, then the
federal court has no discretion. It must independently redetermine the
evidentiary merits of the constitutional claim. Nevertheless, a state
prisoner must exhaust whatever state remedies are open to him, but he
need not petition the Supreme Court for certiorari before requesting
habeas corpus relief."'
The implications of these cases are too many to be covered here, but
a generalized consideration does stand out in bold relief, overshadow-
ing others. These cases underscore, and will help realize, federal con-
stitutional rights. The basic principle embedded in the writ of habeas
corpus is that, in a civilized society, all government, state and federal,
must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment,
and that, ultimately, it is peculiarly the task of the federal courts finally
to pass on the "Supreme Law of the Land." If imprisonment cannot
be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of the supreme
law of the land, then the individual is entitled to his immediate release
and his liberty is guaranteed. The "Great Writ of Habeas Corpus,"
assuring our constitutional rights, sets us apart from all totalitarian
countries.
CONCLUSION
The cases reviewed in this article undoubtedly will have a profound
physical and qualitative impact on the administration of American
criminal justice. Surely, the decisions will provide a useful step toward
lifting criminal law administration from the doldrums which spurred
William Howard Taft to say: "The administration of the criminal law
is a disgrace to our civilization." Even so, the proportions of the prob-
lem are huge. The number of counsel needed is only one aspect, but
consider the following: "It appears that approximately one out of
three of the accused persons facing federal judges is an indigent." 27 -
270 "[W~e have consistently held that federal court jurisdiction is conferred by the
allegation of an unconstitutional restraint and is not defeated by anything that may
occur in the state court proceedings." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963).
271 What the Court held, "necessarily overrules Darr v. Burford to the extent
it may be thought to have barred a state prisoner from Federal habeas corpus relief
if he had failed timely to seek certiorari in this Court from an adverse state decision."
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435 (1963).
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The number of indigents who are tried in our state courts is unknown.
However, seventy-one public defender offices report to the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association:27
Despite their limited coverage, 71 offices reporting to NLADA for
the year 1960 handled 116,568 new criminal cases. There is a total
population of 571/ million in these counties. So, more than two cases
are handled out of every 1,500 population. Applying this figure to the
28 million in the large, non-defender counties, it may be assumed that
there are approximately 56,000 indigent defendants before the courts
each year who must rely upon a court-appointment system for repre-
sentation or none at all. This and the fact that there are scores of
other counties with a population range of 200,000-400,000 without
defender services, reveals a critical problem not only for the impecun-
ious defendant, but for a system of justice based upon the principle of
equality before the law.
Thus, these cases place extensive duties upon Bench and Bar, not to
mention those upon the law schools. 7 4 Each must make its own unique
contribution. 75 Not only will more counsel be needed, but, realisti-
cally, they must be better educated and better paid, 7' if the duties set
forth by these cases are properly to be discharged.
Apart from the duties imposed, one thing should be made clear.
These cases are not startling in their requirements. Little can under-
mine a society more quickly than the denial of its own laws, or worse,
a casual disregard of its organic charter, i.e., the Constitution's guar-
anty of "equal protection of the laws." Unquestionably, law is one of
27 2 Per Mr. Justice Tom C. Clark; this quote is taken from his Law Day Address
delivered at St. Louis University, April 20, 1963.
272 Brief for petitioners, Draper v. Washington (No. 201, Oct. Term, 1962, Sup. Ct.
of the U.S.) 28-29. For a discussion of indigency in rural areas, see Willcox and
Bloustein, Account of A Field Study in A Rural Area of the Representation of Indi-
gents Accused of Crime, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 567 (1959).274 See Clark, The Present State of Trial Advocacy, 12 DEPAUL L. Rxv. 185
(1963).
276 Per Mr. Justice Goldberg:
"Lawyers will soon be tested as to their fidelity to constitutional principles.
"Our Court a few weeks ago ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
an indigent charged with crime be afforded the right of counsel.
"This decision has been almost universally acclaimed as a step towards our goal
of equal justice under the law.
"Today I ask you to reflect upon the responsibility which this constitutional prin-
ciple imposes on the Bar and also to ask yourselves whether the Bar is ready to
assume it." Taken from the Law Day Address of Mr. Justice Goldberg before the
Federal Bar Association, May 1, 1963.
276 Ohio is a good example. There is no limit on the fees that can be awarded
counsel for cases of murder and manslaughter in the first or second degree, and
counsel can obtain up to $300 plus expenses in cases involving other felonies. Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2941.51 (Page Supp. 1962). Also note, Minn. Stat. § 611.07 (1961)
(reasonable expenses plus $25 per day for preparation and $50 per day in court),
Conway v. Sauk County, 19 Wis.2d 599, 120 N.W2d 671 (1963.) (Counsel's total
award for representing an accused indigent in a murder case was $7,620.25).
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the priinary mirrors of a civilization, reflecting the fundamental values
on which it rests. Neither the Supreme Court, nor any other court, can
permit the ideal of equal treatment before the law "to remain an
empty promise...... "Tolerance of short-cut methods in law enforce-
ment impairs its enduring effectiveness."2 ' When comparing ourselves
to other freedom-loving countries, we should recall that in the less
affluent Scandinavian countries, "every accused in a criminal case [is]
entitled to counsel of his own choosing at government expense, to make
all necessary investigations (including searches for witnesses and docu-
ments) and to supply analyses of handwriting as well as expert testi-
mony on behalf of the defendant."2 '9 Thus, although the American
criminal law practice, under the cases reviewed in this article, does not
enc6mpass as broad a protection for an indigent as does the Scandina-
vian practice, the Supreme Court has provided us with the opportunity
described by those well-grounded and realistic words of Charles Evans
Hughes: "Whatever else lawyers may accomplish in public affairs, it
is their privilege and obligation to assure a competent administration of
justice to the needy, so that no man shall suffer in the enforcement of
his legal right for want of a skilled protector, able, fearless and incor-
ruptible."2 '
277 Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958).
278 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
279 FRANK & FRANK, NOT GUILTY 87 (1957).
,280 Hughes, Address to American Bar Association: Justice And Need of Legal
id For Poor, 6 A.B.A.J. 83, 85 (1920); Hughes's view has been underscored by
ormer Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, ". . . the burden of providing a fair
trial is upon the community. The right to representation is a concomitant of fair
trial, and though it is personal to the defendant and may vary with his choice and
means, it cannot be permitted to fail just because the accused is a poor person. At
that point the community must supply the deficiency." Representation of Indigent
Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases, Hearing Before Subcommittee No. 4 of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Repr., Feb. 17, 1954, p. 21.
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